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Abstract
Cap and trade mechanisms enjoy increasing importance in environmental legis-
lation worldwide. The most prominent example is probably given by the European
Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) designed to limit emissions of greenhouse
gases, several other countries already have or are planning the introduction of such
systems.2 One of the important aspects of designing cap and trade mechanisms is
the possibility of competition authorities to grant emission permits for free. Free
allocation of permits which is based on past output or past emissions can lead to
inecient production decisions of rms' (compare for example Bohringer and Lange
(2005), Rosendahl (2007), Mackenzie et al. (2008), Harstad and Eskeland (2010)).
Current cap and trade systems grant free allocations based on installed production
facilities, which lead to a distortion of rms' investment incentives, however.1 It is
the purpose of the present article to study the impact of a cap and trade mechanism
on rms' investment and production decisions and to analyze the optimal design of
emission trading systems in such an environment.
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1 Introduction
In the present article we analyze the impact of a cap and trade mechanism on the technology
mix of production facilities and on rms' nal output decisions. We determine the optimal
design of such a mechanism for ideal market conditions but also for non-ideal situations
where competition authorities' decisions are partially constrained by requirements of the
political or legislative process.
Cap and trade mechanisms designed to internalize social cost of pollution enjoy increas-
ing importance in environmental legislation worldwide. A prominent example is probably
given by the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), several other countries
already have or are planning the introduction of such systems.2 An important aspect when
introducing cap and trade mechanisms is the possibility of competition authorities to grant
emission permits for free. This apparently allowed to crucially facilitate the political pro-
cesses which nally lead to the introduction of currently adopted cap and trade systems.
As Convery(2009) in a recent survey on the origins and the development of the EU ETS
observes:\The key quid pro quos to secure industry support in Germany and across the
EU were agreements that allocation would take place at Member State level [...], and that
the allowances would be free". Very similar observations can also be found in many other
contributions to that issue.3
Clearly, a one and for all lump sum allocation of permits, which is entirely independent
of rms' actions has a purely distributive impact as the seminal contributions to the design
of cap and trade mechanisms have already illustrated (See Coase (1960), Dales (1968) and
Montgomery (1972)).4 However, the design of free allocations in currently active cap and
trade systems is not very likely to have such lump sum property but will include explicit or
implicit features of updating, as several authors argue. Compare for example Neuho et al.
(2006) who observe for the case of the EU ETS: \For the phase I trading period, incumbent
rms received allowances based on their historic emissions.[...] For future trading periods,
the Member States have to again dene NAPs for the ETS. [...] It is likely that the base
2Those include New Zealand, Australia, Canada, United States, for an overview See IEA (2010).
3As for example Tietenberg (2006) observes: "free distribution of permits (as opposed to auctioning
them o) seems to be a key ingredient in the successful implementation of emissions trading programs".
Bovenberg et al. (2008) state:\The compensation issue has come to the fore in recent policy discussions.
For example, several climate change policy bills recently introduced in the U.S. Congress (for example, one
by Senator Je Bingaman of New Mexico and another by Senator Dianne Feinstein of California) contain
very specic language stating that aected energy companies should receive just enough compensation to
prevent their equity values from falling."
4For a recent discussion of the \conditions under which the independence property is likely to hold both
in theory and in practice", see Hahn and Stavis (2010).
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period will be adjusted over time to reect changes in the distribution of plants over time.
It is, for example, dicult to envisage that in phase II a government will decide to allocate
allowances to a power plant that closed down in phase I. This suggests that some element
of 'updating' of allocation plans cannot be avoided if such plans are made sequentially."
Updating of free allocation schemes designed to consistently adapt to an industry's dy-
namic development has an impact on rms' behavior, however. First, it leads to a distortion
of the operation of existing production facilities if rms believe that current output or emis-
sions do have an impact on allocations granted to those facilities in the future.5 Second, it
has an impact on rms' incentives to modify their production facilities through upgrading,
retiring and building of new facilities if free (technology specic) allocations are granted
for all installed facilities.6 Most contributions to the literature which analyze the impact of
free allocations and the optimal design of emission trading systems have focused on the rst
eect and abstract from the latter. That is, they provide very rich insight on the impact of
updating on rms' production and emission decisions, but abstract from an explicit analysis
of rms' incentives to modify their production facilities. The most prominent contributions
include Moledina et al. (2003), Bohringer and Lange (2005), Rosendahl(2007), Mackenzie
et al. (2008), or Harstadt and Eskeland (2010).7
In the present article we want to explicitly analyze the impact of updating on rms'
investment incentives which determine their technology mix in the long run. Since the long
run implications to a large extent are responsible for the nal success of an environmental
legislation this seems to provide an important aspect for the ongoing debate on the optimal
design of emission trading systems. In order to do so we provide an analytical framework
with an endogenous emission permit market where (strategic) rms chose to invest in two
dierent production technologies (with dierent emission intensities) which allow for pro-
duction during a longer horizon of time. We then analyze the impact of a cap and trade
5Compare for example Bohringer and Lange (2005):\As a case in point, one major policy concern is
that [...] the allocation should account for (major) changes in the activity level of rms. Free allocation
schemes must then abstain from lump-sum transfers and revert to output- or emission-based allocation."
6A recent review of current emission trading schemes by the International Energy Agency (IEA 2010)
reveals that most legislations which provide free emission permits do update their allocation schemes:" An
important detail of systems using grandfathered allocation is the treatment of companies that establish
new facilities or close down. Current or proposed schemes generally provide new entrants with the same
support as existing facilities. The rationale for this is to avoid investment moving to jurisdictions without
carbon pricing." A prominent example in this respect is given by the legislation currently observed in phase
II of the EU ETS, in the case of Germany for example new production facilities receive technology specic
free allocations when they start operations, retiring facilities loose their allocations, compare German
Parliament (2007).
7In a recent empirical study on phase I of the EU ETS Anderson and Di Maria (2011) indeed nd
evidence that rms' output decisions have been inated, \possibly due to future policy design features".
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mechanism on rms' technology choices and their production decisions. As a benchmark
we determine the rst best solution. Analogous to the previous literature, if distributional
concerns do not matter, in an ideal market with perfectly competitive rms it is optimal to
grant no free allocation to any technology and to set the total emission cap such that the
permit price equals to marginal social cost of pollution.
In the main part of the paper we then analyze the optimal design of a cap and trade
system if the market is not ideal. First, we consider the case that rms behave imperfectly
competitive when making their investment and their production decisions. It is then optimal
to grant free allocations in order to stimulate ineciently low investment incentives. As
we show, however, in a closed system with endogenous permit market it is not optimal to
implement total investment at rst best levels since this would imply an ineciently high
permit price. It can be optimal, furthermore, to set free allocations such as to induce rms
to choose a technology mix which is even cleaner than in the rst best scenario in order to
depress the endogenous permit price.8
Second, we analyze the case where the design of the cap and trade mechanism is subject
to political constraints (as extensively discussed above) and the competition authority has
to determine the optimal market design given those constraints.9 We rst analyze how the
optimal target on total emissions should be set in case free allocations in all technologies
are exogenously xed. As we nd, for moderate levels of free allocations the target on
total emissions should be set such that the equilibrium permit price is above marginal
social cost of pollution. For high levels of free allocation (as for example for the case of
full allocation where all permits used by a certain technology during a compliance period
are freely allocated, compare for example German Parliament (2007))6 the total cap on
emissions should be set such that the equilibrium permit price should be below marginal
social cost of pollution.
We then analyze the case that free allocation only for a specic technology is exogenously
xed and determine the optimal level of free allocation for the remaining technology. In
order to avoid excessive distortions of the resulting technology mix it is typically optimal
to grant free allocation for the remaining technology. That is, the insights obtained from
8Those results have a direct implication also for other measures designed to stimulate investment incen-
tives of rms, as for example capacity mechanisms introduced in electricity markets, compare for example
Cramton and Stoft (2008).
9Observe that to some extend this parallels the fundamental approach found in the previous literature:
Bohringer and Lange(2005) provide second best rules if (for political reasons) updating has to be based on
past output, Harstadt and Eskeland (2010) analyze market design in case governments cannot commit to
full auctioning of permits and Bovenberg et al. (2005, 2008) consider the constraint that rms have to be
fully compensated for the regulatory burden.
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the rst best benchmark that free allocations are never optimal are no longer true in case
allocation to one of the technologies is exogenously xed. Moreover, if this technology is
relatively dirty (as compared to the technology with exogenously xed allocation) the level
of free allocation should remain below the exogenously xed allocation. If on the contrary
the remaining technology is relatively clean, the level of free allocation should even be above
the exogenously xed allocation. Observe that the current practice of full allocation (as
currently granted in phase II of the EU ETS, compare German Parliament (2007) for the
case of Germany) induces a pattern of free allocation which is completely opposed to those
ndings.
Let us nally mention that from a modeling perspective the present paper also con-
tributes to the literature of peak load pricing which analyzes optimal investment decisions
in several technologies. For a survey on this literature see Crew and Kleindorfer (1995).
More recent contributions include Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011), Zottl (2010), or Zottl
(2011).10 Our framework introduces an endogenous emission permit market with the pur-
pose to internalizes social cost of emissions. This setup allows us to analyze the optimal
design of a cap and trade mechanism by taking into account rms' investment and produc-
tion decisions.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 states the model analyzed
throughout this article, section 3 derives the market equilibrium for a given cap and trade
mechanism. In section 4 we determine the optimal markets design, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider n rms which rst have to choose production facilities from two dierent
technologies prior to competing on many consecutive spot markets with uctuating demand.
Inverse Demand is given by the function P (Q; ), which depends on Q 2 R+, and the
variable  2 R that represents the demand scenario. The parameter  takes on values in
the interval [; ] with frequencies f(). The corresponding distribution is denoted F () =R 

f()d.11 We denote by q() = (q1(); : : : ; qn()) the vector of spot market outputs of the
n rms in demand scenario , and by Q() =
Pn
i=1 qi total quantity produced in scenario
10Based on those analytical frameworks a number of numerical studies tries to quantify the impact of a
cap and trade mechanism on rms' investment decisions for dierent levels of an exogenously xed permit
price (compare for example Neuho et al. (2006), Matthes (2006) or recently Pahle, Fan and Schill (2011)).
11Mathematically we treat the frequencies associated to the realizations of  by making use of a density
and a distribution-function. Notice, however, that there is no uncertainty in the framework presented |
all realizations of  2 [; ] indeed realize, with the corresponding frequency f().
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. Demand in each scenario satises standard regularity assumptions, i.e.12
Assumption 1 (Demand) Inverse demand satises Pq(Q; ) < 0, P(Q; )  0,
Pq(Q; )  0 and Pq(Q; ) + Pqq(Q; )Qn < 0 for all Q;  2 R.
Technologies dier with respect to investment and production cost and emission factors.
Assumption 2 (Technologies) Firms can choose between two dierent technologies,
t=1,2. Each technology t has constant marginal cost of investment kt, constant marginal
cost of production ct, and an emission factor wt which measures the amount of the pollutant
emitted per unit of output.
We denote total investment of rm i in both technologies by x1i and investment of
rm i in technology 2 by x2i, aggregate total investment is denoted by X1 and aggregate
investment in technology 2 by X2.
13 We denote aggregate output produced in scenario 
by Q(). Each unit of output produced with technology t = 1; 2 causes emissions wt. We
denote total emissions (for example of a greenhouse gas) produced at all markets  2 [; ] by
T . The social cost associated to emissions is denoted by D(T ). The competition authority
designs a cap and trade mechanism to internalize this social cost.
Assumption 3 (Cap and Trade Mechanism and Social Cost of Pollution)
Total Pollution T causes a social damage D(T ), which satises DT (T )  0 and
DTT (T )  0. A cap and trade mechanism limits total emissions such that T  T . Each
unit invested in technology t = 1; 2 is assigned the amount At of permits for free.
Permits are tradeable, we make the following assumptions regarding the permit market.
Assumption 4 (Permit Markets) (i) Emission permit trading is arbitrage{free and
storage of permits is costless.
(ii) Firms are price takers at the permit market.14
We denote the market price for emission permits by e. For given investment decisions of a
rm (x1i; x2i) we can now write down marginal production cost of rm i as follows:
C(qi; x1i; x2i) =
8><>:
c2 + w2e for 0 < qi  x2i;
c1 + w1e for x2i < qi  x1i;
1 for x1i < qi:
12We denote the derivative of a function g(x; y) with respect to the argument x, by gx(x; y), the second
derivative with respect to that argument by gxx(x; y), and the cross derivative by gxy(x; y).
13Thus, aggregate investment in technology 1 is given by X1  X2.
14Since emission trading systems typically encompass large regions (several countries in the case of the
EU ETS) this seems to be a quite natural assumption.
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To sum up, at the rst stage, rms simultaneously invest in the two dierent technologies
at marginal cost of investment k1; k2. Investment choices are observed by all rms. Then,
given their investment choices, rms compete at a sequence of spot markets with uctuating
demand in the presence of a cap and trade mechanism. At each spot market , rms
simultaneously choose output qi() which causes emissions. Each rm i has to cover its
total emissions by permits. Depending on the allocation rule (A1; A2) rms obtain permits
for free, contingent on their investment decision. Firms have to purchase permits needed
in excess of the free allocation at the permit market at price e, which is the price at which
the permit market clears given the target T .
3 The Market Equilibrium
In this section we derive the market equilibrium with cap and trade mechanism, for the
case of perfect and imperfect competition. Observe that in the framework analyzed, where
demand uctuates over time it is optimal for rms to invest into a mix of both technologies.
We will consider the case that technology 2 allows cheaper production but exhibits higher
investment cost. Those units have to run most of the time in order to recover their high
investment cost(this is typically denoted "baseload{technology"). Technology 1 has rela-
tively low investment cost but produces at high marginal cost. Those units are built in order
to serve during periods of high demand (this is typically denoted "peakload{technology")
but run idle if demand is low. In order to be able to characterize the market equilibrium
for a given cap and trade mechanism (T;A1; A2), we rst determine rms' prots, given
investments x1; x2 and given spot market output q().
i(x1i; x2i) =
BZ

(P (Q; )  c2   w2e) qi(; x)dF () +
PZ
B
(P (X2; )  c2   w2e) x2idF () (1)
+
PZ
P
(P (Q; )  c1   w1e) qi(; x)dF () +
Z
P
(P (X1; )  c1   w1e)x1idF ()
 
Z
P
((c1 + w1e)  (c2 + w2e))x2idF ()  (k2   A2e)x2i   (k1   A1e)(x1i   x2i):
Note that the permit market aects both, the rms' marginal production cost as well
as their investment cost. No matter whether permits have been allocated for free or have
to be bought at the permit market, rms face opportunity cost of wte when deciding to
produce one unit of output with technology t = 1; 2. This opportunity cost increases their
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marginal production cost to ct + wte, t = 1; 2. Investment cost is aected by the rms'
anticipation of a free allocation of permits. A free allocation is equivalent to a subsidy paid
upon investment: If each unit of capacity invested is assigned At permits, investment cost
kt is reduced by their value, that is by Ate for t = 1; 2.
The critical spot market scenarios15 B; P ; P indicate wether rms produce either at
the capacity bounds x2; x1 (that is, at the vertical pieces of their marginal cost curves),
or on the at (i.e. unconstrained) parts of their marginal cost curves. They depend on
the intensity of competition at the spot market and are illustrated in Figure 1 both for
the case of perfect and imperfect competition. For  2 [; B] rms produce the output at
Figure 1: Illustration of the critical spot market scenarios. Left: The case of a perfectly
competitive market, right: the general case with imperfect competition. In the gure we
denote marginal revenue by MR(Q; ) := P (Q; ) + Pq(Q; )
Q
n
.
marginal cost c2. For  2 [B; P ] rms are constrained by their investment in the base load
technology and produce X2, still at marginal cost c2, and prices are driven by the demand
function. At those demand levels, using the peak load technology 1 is not yet protable.
Observe that F (P ) F (B) measures the fraction of time where investment in the base load
technology is binding, which we will refer to as constrained base duration. For  2 [P ; P ]
rms produce output at marginal cost c1, we denote 1  F (P ) as peak duration.16 Finally,
for all realizations above P , rms are constrained by their total capacity choice X1, and
15For the precise denition of those critical spot market scenarios, see appendix A.
16The equivalent base duration would be given by 1  F () = 1, it is not explicitly introduced, however.
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prices are driven exclusively by the demand function, we denote 1   F ( P ) as constrained
peak duration. In the subsequent lemma we characterize the market equilibrium when rms
invest in the base load and in the peak load technology.
Lemma 1 For a given cap and trade mechanism (T;A1; A2), dene the toal investment
condition 	I , the base investment condition 	II and the permit pricing condition
17 	E as
follows:
	I :=
Z 
P

P (X1 ; ) + Pq(X

1 ; )
X1
n
  (c1 + w1e)

dF ()  (k1   A1e) (2)
	II :=
Z P
B

P (X2 ; ) + Pq(X

2 ; )
X2
n
  (c2 + w2e)

dF () + (3)Z 
P
(c1   c2) + (w1   w2)edF ()  (k2   k1) + (A2   A1)e
	E :=
Z B

w2Q(e
; )dF () +
Z P
B
w2X

2dF () +
Z P
P
w1Q(e
; )dF () (4)
+
Z 
P
w1X

1dF () 
Z 
P
(w1   w2)X2dF ()  T
Equilibrium investment X1; X2 and the equilibrium permit price e simultaneously solve
	I = 	II = 	E = 0.
Proof See appendix A. 
In the lemma, (2) is the rst order condition that determines total investment. Firms
choose their total investment
X1
n
as to equal marginal prots generated by their last running
unit (running at total marginal cost c1+w1e
) to the investment cost of that unit (given by
k1 A1e). As already mentioned above, under a cap and trade mechanism, the value of the
permits reuired for production at the spot market is part of the rms' marginal production
cost, the value of free allocations is of rms' marginal cost of investment.
Now let us provide some intuition on the determinants of the optimal base load in-
vestment. Since total investment X1 has already been xed (it is determined by (2)), the
rms' decision when choosing X2 has to be interpreted as a decision of virtually replacing
units of technology 1 by technology 2. The cost of such virtual replacement of the marginal
unit (given by k2   k1   (A2  A1)e) has to equal the extra prots generated by that unit
17For a positive permit price, we might also obtain the situation, where production for very low demand
realizations is suppressed and positive output is produced only for demand realizations which satisfy  :
P (0; )   C(0; )   e > 0. For ease of notation we disregard this corner solution, which could be easily
included in the entire analysis.
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due to lower marginal production cost. Lower production cost of one additional unit has
two eects: First, for all demand realizations  2 [B; P ] one more unit is produced (that
would not have been produced without the replacement); for  2 [P ; ] one more unit can
be produced at lower marginal cost c2+w2e
 (instead of c1+w1e) due to the replacement.
(Compare also gure 1).
The market price for permits, e, depends on the emission target T set by the market
designer as well as the technology mix installed by the rms. At the equilibrium permit
price the market exactly clears, allowing for total emission of T units of the pollutant.
Notice that the left hand side of expression (4) is just total production at all spot markets
multiplied by the emission factors of the respective Technologies (w1; w2), total emissions
are obtained by integrating over emissions at all spot markets  2 [; ].
Finally observe that lemma 1 characterizes the market solution when rms decide to
invest in both technologies, that is, when indeed 0 < X2 < X

1 obtains. First, whenever
the base load technology (k2; c2) is very unattractive,
18 then only the peak load technology
(k1; c1) is active. Second, if the base load technology (k2; c2) is always more attractive
19
than the peak load technology (k1; c1), then only technology (k2; c2) is active in the market
equilibrium. Notice that in principle the case of investment in a single technology is cov-
ered by out framework, it obtains by eliminating the possibility to invest in technology 2,
expression (2)) then determines investment in the single technology. To keep the notational
burden limited, however, we do not explicitly include those corner solution in the exposition
of the paper, but opted to focus on all those cases when rms indeed choose to investment
in both technologies.
To conclude the discussion of lemma 1 let us already at this point mention the rele-
vance of endogenously modeling the emission permit market as compared to the case which
assumes an exogenously xed price for pollution. Observe that, for a constant emission
price equilibrium investment under imperfect competition diers from that obtained under
perfect competition by the terms
R 
P
Pq(X1; )
X1
n
and
R P
B
Pq(X2; )
X2
n
dF () respectively,
which corresponds to the dierence between scarcity prices and marginal scarcity prots.
Since those terms are negative (and prots concave given our assumptions) investment in-
centives under imperfect competition are lower than under perfect competition. That is,
in the absence of an explicit market for emission permits (when pollution is for example
taxed at some xed level e0) subsidies for investment (for example by granting free tax
vouchers A1 > 0 and A2 > A1 respectively) which exactly compensate for those dierences
would induce optimal investment incentives. Since the emission price is endogenous in our
18That is expression (3) yields X2  0.
19That is expressions (3) and (2) yield X2  X1 .
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framework, however, we will obtain a dierent result (compare theorem 2).
Before we now discuss existence of the market equilibrium we introduce the follow-
ing denitions which will simplify the subsequent analysis and allow for a more intuitive
discussion of our results:
Definition 1 (i) We denote the impact of increased total investment on total emissions
(for xed e) by AE1 :=
@	E
@X1
= (1  F ( P ))w1, observe AE1 > 0. This allows to state
the impact of changed emission price e on the equilibrium condition 	I as follows
@	I
@e = A1   AE1 .
(ii) We denote the impact of increased base load investment on total emissions (for xed
e) by AE2 :=
@	E
@X2
= (1  F ( B))w2   (1  F (P ))w1. This allows to state the impact
of changed emission price e on the equilibrium condition 	II as follows @	II@e =
A2   A1   AE2 . We furthermore denote wE2 := 1 F (P )1 F ( B)w1 (which implies A
E
2 > 0
if and only if w2 > w
E
2 ) and w
L
2 :=
F (P ) F (P )
1 F ( B) w1 (which implies A
E
1 +A
E
2 > 0 if and
only if w2 > w
L
2 ).
(iii) We denote the impact of changed X1 on the equilibrium condition 	I by 	I1 :=
@	I
@X1
,
the impact of changed X2 on the equilibrium condition 	II by 	II2 :=
@	II
@X2
and the
impact of changed e on the equilibrium condition 	E by 	Ee :=
@	E
@e . Observe that
those three expressions are negative.
Observe20 that AE1 = (1  F ( P ))w1 determines the total amount of additionally neces-
sary permits resulting from an additionally invested unit of total capacity (formally given
by the partial derivative of total emission with respect to X1, i.e.
@	E
@X1
). An increase of
the permit price e now has two opposing eects on total investment incentives: on the one
hand investment incentives are reduced by the amount AE1 , on the other hand they increase
by A1 due to the increased value of free allocations.
A similar reasoning obtains for investment incentives in the base load technology. AE2
determines the total amount of additionally necessary permits resulting from the replace-
ment of one unit of the peak technology with one unit of the base technology (formally
given by the partial derivative of total emission with respect to X2, i.e.
@	E
@X2
). An increase
of the permit price e has two opposing eects on total investment incentives: on the one
hand they are reduced by the amount AE2 , on the other hand they increase by (A2   A1)
due to the increased value of free allocations.
20Notice that the statements of denition 1 and the subsequent discussion exclusively refer to partial
derivatives. In equilibrium total emissions do not change since they are capped at T .
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Notice that AE1  0 whereas AE2 can also become negative. That is, an increased level of
total investment X1 always implies additionally necessary emission permits. An increased
level of base investment X2 does only imply additionally necessary emission permits if
the base technology is \dirtier" than the peak technology. Interestingly the cut{o point
obtains for w2 = w
E
2 < w1, since an increased level of X

2 leads to increased emissions for
 2 [P ; ] if w2 > w2 but also leads to one unit of additional output for the demand levels
 2 [B; P ].
As already argued, lemma 1 only characterizes the market equilibrium by establishing
necessary conditions. In the subsequent lemma ne now want to establish conditions second
order conditions for the existence of the market equilibrium.
Lemma 2 (Second Order Conditions) (i) Lemma 1 characterizes the market equi-
librium if
(a)
 
A1  AE1

AE1  	I1	Ee < 0; (b)
 
A2  A1  AE2

AE2  	II2	Ee < 0
(c)
  
A1  AE1

AE1  	I1	Ee
   
A2  A1  AE2

AE2  	II2	Ee

>
 
A1  AE1

AE1
 
A2  A1  AE2

AE2
(ii) If the levels of free allocation satisfy
 
A1   AE1

AE1  0 and
 
A2   A1   AE2

AE2  0,
then condition (i) is satised.
(iii) Dene by Alim1 the highest A1 yielding
 
A1   AE1

AE1  	I1	Ee  0, dene by Alim2 the
highest A2 yielding
 
A2   AE1   AE2
  
AE1 + A
E
2
  (	I1 +	II2)	Ee  0. The second
order conditions (i) cannot be satised if either A1  Alim1 , or A2  Alim1 .
Proof See appendix B. 
Part (i) of the lemma establishes the standard second order conditions which establishes
negative semi{deniteness of the Hessian matrix of rms' optimization problem. It allows
the usual application of the implicit function theorem in order to conduct an analysis of
comparative statics for the equilibrium characterized in lemma 1. In part (ii) we establish
conditions when those second order conditions are satised and part (iii) provides an upper
bound on the levels of free allocation such that higher allocations always violate those
second order conditions.
Let us explicitly mention at this point that our analysis throughout this article focuses
on symmetric investment decisions, the second order conditions established in lemma 2(i)
guarantee that lemma 1 characterizes a unique symmetric solution. Since for the case of a
monopolistic or a perfectly competitive market asymmetric investment levels are irrelevant21
lemma 2(i) guarantees a existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium in those cases.
21For perfect competition observe that both marginal cost of investment and marginal cost of production
are constant, for monopoly observe that asymmetries cannot arise by denition.
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For the case of oligopoly, when rms behave strategically, asymmetric investment levels
might be relevant, however. Indeed, as we show in a companion paper (Zoettl(2010))
for investment decisions in a discrete number of technologies symmetric equilibria can only
exist if technologies are suciently dierent, for suciently similar technologies a symmetric
equilibrium of the investment game always fails to exist and asymmetric equilibria might
arise.22
After having established the market equilibrium, we now determine the impact of chang-
ing the parameters of the cap and trade mechanism (A1; A2; T ) in an analysis of comparative
statics. If the second order conditions specied in lemma 2 (i) are satised we obtain the
following results:
Lemma 3 (Comparative Statics of the market Equilibrium) (i) Higher
free allocation for the base load technology A2 always yields higher investment
in the base load technology (i.e. dX2
dA2
> 0). We furthermore obtain dX1
dA2
< 0
if and only if
 
A1   AE1

AE2 < 0. Dene A
cross
1 as the highest A1 yielding 
A1   AE1

AE2  	Ee	I1  
 
A1   AE1

AE1 , we obtain
dX2
dA2
<
dX1
dA2
if and only if 
w2 > w
E
2

and A1 2 (Across1 ; Alim1 ).
(ii) Higher free allocation for the peak load technology A1 always yields higher investment
in the peak load technology (i.e. dX1
dA1
> dX2
dA1
). Dene by Atotal2 the highest A2 which
yields
 
A2   AE1   AE2

AE2   	II2	Ee  0 and by Across2 the highest A2 which yields 
A2   AE1   AE2

AE1   	I1	Ee  0. There exists a unique wS2 with wE2 < wS2  w1
such that
dX1
dA1
< 0 if and only if w2 > w
S
2 and A2 2 (Atotal2 ; Alim2 ). Furthermore, we
obtain
dX2
dA1
> 0 if and only if w2 < w
S
2 and A2 2 (Across2 ; Alim2 ).
(iii) For a change of the total emission cap T we obtain
dX1
dT
> 0 if and only if
 
A1 < A
E
1

,
we furthermore obtain
dX2
dT
> 0 if and only if (A2   A1 < AE2 ).
Proof See appendix C. 
As we establish in the theorem, an increase of the free allocation A2 in the base load
technology always leads to increased base load investment (i.e.
dX2
dA2
> 0, see point (i)),
an increase of the free allocation A1 in the peak load technology always leads to increased
investment in the peak load technology (i.e.
dX1
dA1
>
dX2
dA1
, see point (ii)). The impact of
22As analyzed in Zoettl(2010) those problems can be overcome when rms are allowed to choose from
a continuum of technologies, when existence and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium can be reestab-
lished. Those ndings to some extend seem to be parallel the discussion on supply function equilibria, where
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium when rms can bid
smooth supply functions, whereas von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) show than a symmetric equilibrium in
discrete step functions fails to exist.
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Figure 2: Results of comparative statics in the degree of free allocation. Left: For the degree
of free allocation to the base load technology A2, Right: For the degree of free allocation
to the peak load technology A1. For the case of linear demand we obtain,
left: Across1 (w) =
1 F (P )
1 F (B)F (B)w2, A
cross
1 (w
E
2 ) = w
E
2 , A
lim
1 (0) = (1  F (P ))w1 and
right: Atotal2 (w) =

1  1 F (P )
1 F (B)F (B)

w2, A
cross
2 (w
S
2 ) = w
E
2 .
such changes on the remaining investment decisions is more ambiguous. In the subsequent
paragraphs we briey sketch the central trade-os, a complete proof is only provided in
the appendix, however. First consider a variation of the free allocation A2 and determine
its impact on the system of equilibrium conditions established in lemma 1. The total
dierential yields:23
d	I
dA2
= 	I1
dX1
dA2
+	Ie
de
dA2
= 0 (5)
d	II
dA2
= 	II2
dX2
dA2
+	IIe
de
dA2
+
@	II
@A2
= 0 (6)
d	E
dA2
= 	E1
dX1
dA2
+	E2
dX2
dA2
+	Ee
de
dA2
= 0 (7)
In order to directly evaluate the impact of the changed emission price de

dA2
on the equilib-
rium conditions for total investment and investment in the base load technology, we solve
23For a better traceability of our computations we denote the partial derivatives @	I@e = 	Ie,
@	II
@e = 	IIe,
@	E
@X1
= 	E1 and
@	E
@X2
= 	E2, in a second step we make use of A
E
1 and A
E
2 introduced in denition 1.
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expression (7) for de

dA2
= 	E1 	Ee
dX1
dA2
+ 	E2 	Ee
dX2
dA2
and plug into expression (5), which yields:
d	I
dA2
=

	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

dX1
dA2
+

	Ie
	E2
 	Ee

dX2
dA2
= 0 (8)
,   	Ee	I1 +  A1  AE1 AE1  dX1dA2 +   A1  AE1 AE2  dX

2
dA2
= 0
Observe that the coecient on the expression
dX1
dA1
determines the total impact of changed
X1 on the equilibrium condition 	I . This is given by the direct impact (i.e. 	I1) and the
indirect impact which takes into account the impact of changed X1 on the emission price
and its feed back on the equilibrium condition 	I (i.e. 	Ie
	E1
 	Ee =
1
 	Ee
 
A1   AE1

AE1 ).
Observe that the total impact of changed X1 on the equilibrium condition 	I is negative
if the second order conditions established in lemma 2(i) are to be satised. This directly
illustrates why
dX2
dA2
cannot drop to zero.
Furthermore, observe that the total impact of changed X2 on the equilibrium condition
	I is only indirect, since 	I does not directly depend on X2. That is, we only have to
take into account the impact of increased X2 on the emission price e
 and its feedback
on the equilibrium condition 	I . According to denition 1 an increase of X2 leads to an
increased equilibrium emission price if AE2 > 0 (i.e. for w2 > w
E
2 , we obtain a decreased
equilibrium emission price if AE2 < 0, i.e. for w2 < w
E
2 ). The impact of an increased
emission price on the equilibrium condition 	I depends on the the degree of free allocation
A1. Whenever A1 < A
E
1 (i.e.
@	I
@e < 0, compare denition 1) an increased emission price
leads to a decrease of rms' total investment activity X1 . In this case the reduction of
scarcity rents (obtained when total capacity is binding) caused by the increased emission
price dominates the increased value associated to the permits granted for free. The reverse
holds true for a high level of free allocation, i.e. A1 > A
E
1 where an increased emission
price leads to increased total investment X1 . Whenever the impact of increased investment
X2 yields a decreased emission price, which obtains for cleaner base load technologies (for
AE2 < 0, i.e. w2 < w
E
2 ), we obtain the opposite results. In sum,
dX1
dA2
> 0 if and only if 
A1   AE1

AE2 > 0, as stated in the theorem.
Finally expression (8) also provides the intuition under which conditions we obtain
dX1
dA2
 dX2
dA2
(i.e. also investment in the peak load technology increases). To this end observe
that
dX1
dA2
=
dX2
dA2
if and only if in expression (8) the total impact of changed X1 is precisely
of the same size as the total impact of changed X2 , but of opposite sign. As shown in
the theorem this only obtains in case the increase of investment in the base technology
leads to an increase of the emission price (for AE2 > 0, i.e. w2 > w
E
2 ) and if this increase
has a suciently positive impact on the equilibrium condition 	I , i.e. for allocation A1
suciently big (for A1 > A
cross
1 > A
E
1 ). All those results are illustrated in the left graph of
gure 2.
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Likewise we can analyze the impact of changing A1, as established in theorem 3(ii).
Analogous to expressions (19) (20) and (21) we can determine the total derivative and
solve for de

dA1
. After plugging in, we obtain for d	I
dA1
+ d	II
dA1
(observe @	I
@A1
=  @	II
@A1
= e):
d	I
dA1
+
d	II
dA1
=

	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee +	IIe
	E1
 	Ee

dX1
dA1
+

	II2 +	IIe
	E2
 	Ee +	Ie
	E2
 	Ee

dX2
dA1
= 0 (9)
,   	Ee	I1 +  A2  AE1  AE2 AE1  dX1dA1 +   	Ee	II2 +  A2  AE1  AE2 AE2  dX

2
dA1
= 0
Analogous to above the coecients on the expressions
dX2
dA1
and
dX1
dA1
determine the impact of
changed investment X1 or X

2 on both equilibrium conditions. The sum of both coecients
is strictly negative if second order conditions are not to be violated (compare lemma 2(iii)).
This directly illustrates why dX2
dA1
cannot reach the level of dX1
dA1
(in other words, increased
free allocation A1 cannot leave investment in the peak load technology unchanged).
Furthermore, as we show, for small A2 both coecients are negative (thus
dX1
dA1
and
dX2
dA1
have opposite signs), since
dX1
dA1
>
dX2
dA1
this implies
dX2
dA1
< 0. Observe that the coecient of
the expression
dX1
dA1
is increasing in A2, the coecient of expression
dX1
dA1
is increasing in A2 if
AE2 > 0 (i.e. w2 > w
E
2 ). That is, for A2 high enough the coecients become non{negative,
leading to altered monotonicity behavior. As we show in the theorem we can establish a
relative level of dirtiness wS2 (with w
S
2  wE2 and wS2 = wE2 in the case of linear demand),
which separates the cases when either of the coecients becomes zero for higher levels of
A2 (Remember the sum of both coecients has to be negative in order to satisfy the second
order conditions, see above). Whenever the coecient of
dX1
dA1
equals to zero, expression (9)
directly implies
dX2
dA1
= 0 and vice versa, as stated in the theorem.
Finally, in theorem 3(iii) we provide the results of comparative statics with respect to
the parameter T . For an intuition of those results observe rst of all that an increase of
the total emission cap T leads to a reduction of the equilibrium permit price. This in turn
induces increased total investment X1 if (similar to the intuition for part (i)) the increase
of scarcity rents (which obtains due to lower emission price) dominates the decreased value
of the emission permits granted for free, i.e. A1 < A
E
1 . The opposite result obtains for
A1 > A
E
1 . Similarly, the reduced emission price induces increased investment in the base
load technologyX2 if the total impact of reduced emission price on the base load investment
condition is negative, i.e. if and only if A2 < A1 + A
E
2 (i.e. 	IIe < 0). If we denote total
emissions which obtain in the absence of any environmental policy by T . Lowering the cap
on total emissions T below T corresponds to the introduction of a cap and trade mechanism.
To provide the direct connection of our framework with current practice in competition
policy, let us conclude this section by briey discussing the impact of introducing a cap and
trade mechanism as observed for example during the current phase of the EU ETS. In this
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phase, the free allocations granted for free to a unit of each class of technologies were such
as to cover the total needs necessary on average to operate that unit.24 In our framework
that would correspond to levels of free allocation Afull1 2 [1   (F (P ))w1; 1   (F (P ))w1]
and Afull2 2 [1  (F (B))w2; w2]. 25 With an allocation scheme (Afull1 ; Afull2 ) which aims at
covering the average total needs of a unit of specic technology we obtain increased total
investment and increased base load investment when introducing the trading system (i.e.
the emission cap is lowered below T in our framework). To see this, rst observe that
Afull1 > A
E
1 which according to lemma 3 (iii) leads to an increase of X

1 . Second observe
that Afull2   Afull1 > AE2 (since Afull2 > (1   F (B))w2 and Afull1 < (1   F (P ))w1), which
according to lemma 3 (iii) leads to increased investment in the base load technology.
In order to apply our ndings of lemma 3(i) consider again our example of an electricity
markets with lignite or coal red plants as a representative base load technology and open
cycle gas turbines as a representative peak load technology. Since open cycle gas turbines
have lower emission factors, we obtain w2 > w1, which directly implies w2 > w
E
2 (compare
denition 1). Since furthermore Afull1 > A
E
1 as established above, we can directly conclude
that an increase (decrease) of the free allocation A2 not only would yield increased base
load investment but also an increased (decreased) emission price and increased (decreased)
total investment.
After having analyzed the market equilibrium which obtains in the presence of an emis-
sion trading system and derived its properties of comparative statics we now proceed to the
main part of this article and analyze the optimal design of a cap and trade mechanism.
4 The Optimal Cap and Trade Mechanism
In this section we determine the optimal cap and trade mechanism. We rst determine the
rst best solution as a benchmark, which obtains for the case of a perfectly competitive
market when a regulator can freely choose all parameters (A1; A2; T ) of the cap and trade
mechanism (see theorem 1). We then analyze several market imperfections and solve for
24To give a specic example: In the German electricity market free allocation is determined by a tech-
nology specic emission factor which measures average emissions per unit of electricity produced (0.365
tCO2/MWh for gaseous fuels and 0.750 tCO2/MWh for solid and liquid fuels) multiplied by a preestab-
lished technology specic average usage. For open cycle gas turbines in Germany the average usage is
established at 0:11 (i.e. 1000 hours per year), for coal and combined cycle gas turbines it is given by 0:86
(i.e. 7500 hours per year) and for lignite plants it is given by 0:94 (i.e. 8250 hours per year), See appendices
3 and 4 of German Parliament (2007).
25To be precise, in our framework average usage of the base technology is 1X2
R B

Q()dF () + (1  
F (B)), the average usage of the peak technology is
1
X1 X2
R P
P
(Q() X2 ) dF () + (1   F (P )). The
corresponding emission factors are given by w1 and w2 respectively.
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the corresponding second best solutions. We rst determine the optimal cap and trade
mechanism which should be chosen for an imperfectly competitive market (see section 4.1).
We then analyze the case when competition authorities cannot freely choose all parameters
(A1; A2; T ) of the cap and trade mechanism but only a subset of them (see section 4.2). In
order to answer all those questions we rst determine total welfare generated in a market
with some cap and trade mechanism (A1; A2; T ):
W (A1; A2; T ) =
BZ

"Z Q
0
(P (Y; )  c2)Y dY
#
dF () +
PZ
B
"Z X2
0
(P (X2 ; )  c2)Y dY
#
dF ()
PZ
P
"Z Q
0
(P (Y; )  c1)Y dY
#
dF () +
Z
P
"Z X1
0
(P (X1 ; )  c1)Y dY
#
dF ()
 
Z
P
(c1   c2)X2dF ()  k2X2   k1(X1  X2 ) D(T ): (10)
Observe, that welfare does not directly depend on the parameters (A1; A2; T ) chosen for
the cap and trade mechanism but only indirectly through the implied investment and
production decisions X1 ; X

2 and Q
. In order to maintain presentability of the results, we
relegated all computations to the appendix and directly characterize the optimal cap and
trade mechanism in the subsequent lemma.
Lemma 4 The optimal cap and trade mechanism solves the following conditions:
(i) WA1 :=
dX1
dA1

I +
dX2
dA1

II = 0
(ii) WA2 :=
dX1
dA2

I +
dX2
dA2

II = 0
(iii) WT :=
dX1
dT

I +
dX2
dT

II  DT (T ) + e + 
n
= 0:
The expressions 
I and 
II determine the total impact of changed X

1 and changed X

2
respectively on total Welfare. They are dened as follows:

I :=
Z 
P
 PqX1
n
dF () A1e   
n
AE1 
II :=
Z P
B
 PqX2
n
dF ()  (A2  A1)e   
n
AE2 :
The term 
n
:=
R 
B

dQ
de

 Pq Q

n

dF ()+
R 
P
P
dQ
de

 Pq Q

n

dF ()R 
B
 (
dQ
de w2)dF ()+
R 
P
P
( dQ

de w1)dF ()
> 0 determines the impact of
changed emissions on welfare for those spot markets where investment is not binding.
Proof See appendix D. 
We now provide some intuition for the conditions which characterize an optimal cap and
trade mechanism. We rst consider the optimal choice of the free allocation to the peak
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load technology given by A1. Observe that the optimality conditions (i) and (ii) express
the impact of changed free allocation on total welfare exclusively through the channel of
changed investment in the base load technology X2 and changed total investment X

1 . The
total impact of changed investment on total welfare is denoted by 
I and 
II , this total
impact can be broken down into three components corresponding to the three summands
of 
I and 
II respectively.
First, observe that at all those spot markets where total investment is binding (i.e.
for  2 [B; P ] and  2 [P ; ] respectively) imperfectly competitive investment behavior
induces too low investment incentives, an increase of investmentX2 orX

1 leads to increased
welfare given by the markup  Pq Xn . Second, free allocation A1 > 0 or (A2 A1) > 0 induces
too high investment incentives, thus an increase of investment would lead to a reduction
of welfare given by the monetary value of the free allocation (i.e. A1e
 and (A2   A1)e).
Notice that in a world with exogenously xed emission price e the optimal level of free
allocation should be chosen such as to balance those two eects.26 Since the emission price
is endogenous in our analysis, an additional term obtains. An increase of investment dX1
or dX2 leads to increased emissions of dX

1A
E
1 and dX

2A
E
2 at those spot markets where
investment is binding. Since total emissions are capped by T , however, this necessarily
has to imply an equivalent reduction of emissions at those spot markets where investment
is not binding (i.e. for  2 [; B] or  2 [P ; P ]). Since production decisions are also
imperfectly competitive, a reduction of output leads to reduced welfare generated at those
spot markets. This impact is quantied by the term 
n
dened in the lemma. That is,
taking into account the endogenous nature of the emission price leads to a lower degree of
optimal free allocation A1 than suggested by an analysis with exogenously xed emission
price.
The impact of a changed emission cap T on total welfare has a similar structure than
the impact of changed free allocations. Analogous to above, a changed emission cap leads
to changed investment incentives, the impact of changed investment incentives on welfare
is given by the terms 
I and 
II , which have already been discussed above. As we will
see later on in theorems 1 and 2, if the levels of free allocation are chosen optimally such
as to obtain 
I = 
II = 0 those terms will not be relevant for the optimal choice of the
emission cap. If the levels of free allocation are not chosen optimally, however, they have to
be considered when determining the optimal level of the emission cap T (compare theorems
3, 4, 5 and 6).
26That is, the monetary subsidy A1e
 for example should then equate to the integral of the markups
over all relevant spot markets. The intuition for this result in some sense parallels the quite well known
insight obtained for a simple static model where a monopolist can be induced to produce rst best output
if he obtains a subsidy corresponding to his markup.
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Apart from having an impact on investment incentives, a changed emission cap T leads
to changed welfare also through several other channels. First, most apparently an increased
emission cap leads to increased emissions which reduce welfare by the marginal social cost of
pollution DT . Second, observe that on the other hand an increased emission cap leads to a
welfare increase since it implies a reduced emission price which allows for increased output.
The welfare increase at each spot market is given by the changed output multiplied by
the dierence between marginal cost as perceived by the rms and true marginal cost, i.e.
dQ(wie
), for i = 1; 2. Put dierently however, this corresponds to the changed pollution
at each spot market multiplied by the emission price e, the change in welfare at all spot
markets then is simply given by the total change of emissions multiplied by the emission
price i.e. dTe. As we will see in the subsequent theorem 1, for a perfectly competitive
market the optimal cap and trade mechanism only balances those two eects and equates
the marginal social cost of pollution to the emission price (i.e. e = DT ).27 Third, observe
that an increased emission cap T leads to a reduced emission price. This allows to reduce the
welfare loss obtained due to imperfect competition at those spot markets where investment
is not binding and output too low. Notice that the impact of changed emissions on welfare
at those spot markets where investment is not binding has already been discussed above,
it is given by 
n
.
Based on the ndings of lemma 4 as the rst best benchmark we can now directly
establish the optimal cap and trade mechanism which obtains for a perfectly competitive
market
Theorem 1 (Optimal Market Design, First Best Benchmark) Under perfect
competition the optimal market design satises
(i) A1 = 0 (ii) A

2 = 0 (iii) T
 : e = DT (T ):
Proof See appendix E. 
The theorem demonstrates that in a competitive market (i.e. n ! 1), full auctioning
is unambiguously optimal (i.e. no free allocations should be granted). A brief glance to
lemma 4 and the intuition provided reveals that investment incentives of rms under perfect
competition are optimal, positive free allocation would lead to reduced welfare. Moreover,
as condition (iii) shows, the emission target T should be set such that the equilibrium
permit price equals marginal social cost of environmental damage. That is, as already dis-
cussed above, the optimal cap and trade mechanism balances welfare losses due to foregone
27This parallels the fundamental tradeo obtained in a simple static model where a Pigou tax should
just equal to the marginal social damage of pollution.
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production at all spot markets given by e with the marginal social cost of pollution given
by DT .
in the subsequent two sections we now consider market imperfections which make an
attainment of the rst best outcome impossible. First, we determine the design of an
optimal cap and trade mechanism for an imperfectly competitive market (see section 4.1).
Apart from imperfect competition, another source of market imperfection arises when the
competition authorities cannot freely choose all parameters (A1; A2; T ) of the cap and trade
mechanism, but only a subset. Such situations arise for example when the level of free
allocation for (some of) the dierent technologies or the total emission cap is exogenously
xed due to political arrangements or lobbing of rms and the competition authority can
only determine the remaining parameters (see section 4.2).
4.1 Optimal Market Design under Imperfect Competition
After having determined the rst best benchmark (theorem 1) we now determine the optimal
cap and trade mechanism for an imperfectly competitive market.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Market Design under Imperfect Competition) Under
imperfect competition the optimal market design satises
(i) A1 =
1
e
 Z 
P
 PqX1
n

dF ()  
n
AE1
!
(ii) A2 =
1
e
 Z P
B
 PqX2
n

dF () +
Z 
P
 PqX1
n

dF ()  
n
 
AE1 +A
E
2
!
(iii) T  : e = DT (T )  
n
:
Now assume that Pq = 0. We then obtain A

1 > 0. For w2  wE2 we obtain A2 > A1, for
w2 > w
E
2 we can obtain A

2 = 0.
Proof See appendix E. 
The optimal levels of free allocations (A1; A

2) under imperfect competition are thus
typically dierent from zero, a striking dierence to the result obtained under perfect com-
petition (see theorem 1). The fundamental reason why this is the case follows directly from
the insights provided by lemma 1 and the subsequent discussion of the results: Imperfectly
competitive rms not only exercise market power at the spot markets, but also choose their
capacity such that they optimally benet from scarcity prices, implying reduced production
and investment incentives.
As already discussed in the text following lemma 1 (compare the last paragraph which
discusses lemma 1), for an exogenously xed price for pollution (e.g. a pigouvian tax at
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some xed level e) optimal investment incentives are obtained by subsidizing investment
such as to precisely compensate for the dierence between scarcity rents and marginal
scarcity prots. To stick as close as possible to our notation such subsidy could be made
by assigning the amounts A1 and A2 of free tax vouchers to each unit invested in either of
the technologies. The optimal level of tax vouchers is then given by expressions (i) and (ii)
of theorem 2 (notice that for exogenously xed permit price we have  = 0).
Remember that in our framework the expression 
n
allowed to quantify the impact of
changed emissions at those spot markets where investment is not binding. Positive free allo-
cation leads to increased investment incentives, which (through an increased emission price)
can lead to reduced output (and thus pollution) at those spot market where investment is
not binding. The terms including the expression 
n
take this welfare loss into account. This
leads to a reduced level of the optimal degree of free allocation. As we show in the theorem,
under imperfect competition the degree of free allocation for the peak load technology is
always positive. For the optimal allocation for the base load technology ambiguous results
obtain. If the base load technology is less emission intensive than the peak load technology
(i.e. w2  w1) increased investment in the base load technology leads to reduced emissions
and thus allows for more output at spot markets where investment is not binding. As we
show this always implies A2 > A

1. On the other hand, if the base load technology is more
emission intensive than the peak load technology (w2 > w1, i.e. an increase of base load
investment leads to increased emission price), then it might be optimal to set A2 < A

1 or
even A2 < 0 as we show.
Finally consider the optimal choice of the total emission cap T for the case of imperfect
competition. A brief look at the optimality condition (iii) established in lemma 4 reveals,
that the impact of a changed emission cap on investment decisions can be neglected since the
levels of free allocation are determined optimally (such as to obtain 
I = 
II = 0). What
matters, however, is the fact that an increased emission cap leads to a reduced emission
price which in turn allows to reduce the welfare loss induced by imperfectly competitive
production decisions at those spot markets where investment is not binding (given by 
n
).
As a result the optimal cap on total emissions is chosen such as to yield an emission price
below the marginal social cost of pollution.
In sum, the main intuition why an optimal cap and trade mechanism (with endogenous
emission price) implies levels of free allocation which are dierent from zero is similar to the
intuition obtained for the case of an exogenously xed price for pollution (e.g. a pigouvian
tax): Under imperfect competition rms' investment and production incentives are too low,
leading to decreased welfare. Free allocations can provide adequate incentives which lead to
an increase of welfare. However, for the case of an endogenous emission price, as modeled
in the present paper, increased investment incentives also lead to an increased emission
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price which in turn aggravates welfare losses at those spot market where investment is not
binding.
Let us nally discuss those results in the light of recently proposed measures thought
to increase rms' investment incentives, as for example observed in liberalized electricity
markets. In the perception of many economists and policy makers investment incentives in
those markets are too low, one of the reasons potentially being market power as modeled
in the present paper. To resolve those problems of too low investment incentives, several
measures have been proposed, among them capacity mechanisms.28 For the present discus-
sion we clearly have to abstract form the specic problems encountered when designing real
capacity markets, and just consider some subsidy st paid to the rms per unit of invest-
ment made in technology t = 1; 2. Notice that in the present framework it is equivalent if
a monetary payment st or free allocations with value Ate
 for t = 1; 2 are granted to a rm
per unit of investment in a technology t. What exclusively matters for rms' investment
incentives is the total value st + Ate
 granted to rms per unit of investment, this total
value should be set at an optimal level.29
This in turn implies, however, that, once a cap and trade mechanism is put in place in
specic given market, the implications of this cap and trade have to be taken into account
when designing the capacity market. More specically the design of a capacity market
which disregards the endogenous nature of emission prices, will lead to too high investment
incentives. However, we establish furthermore that also when taking into account the
endogenous nature of the emission price, the subsidy granted to the peak load technology
should be positive, if the base load technology is less emission intensive it should receive a
subsidy which exceeds that of the peak load technology. However, a relatively dirty base
load technology should not receive any free allocations.
4.2 Optimal Design of a Partially Constrained Cap and Trade
Mechanism
In theorems 1 and 2 we determined the optimal design of a cap and trade mechanism when
all its parameters (A1; A2; T ) can be freely chosen by the competition authority. We rst
28In most restructured electricity markets in the United States so called "capacity markets" are installed
in order to increase ineciently low investment incentives, also in Europe policy makers consider their
introduction (see e.g. Cramton and Stoft (2008)).
29Consequently, optimality just requires that the sum of both parameters satises the above optimality
conditions. An immediate and interesting implication is that possible ineciencies due to grandfathering
could be healed by capacity payments that compensate for the distorting eect without any eciency losses
(as long as the subsidies resulting from free allocations are not higher than the sum of both parameters
should be).
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analyzed the case of a perfectly competitive market, which yields the rst best benchmark
(theorem 1) and then the case of imperfect competition (theorem 2). Another source of
market imperfection, apart from imperfect competition, arises when the competition au-
thorities cannot freely choose all parameters (A1; A2; T ) of the cap and trade mechanism.
Such rigidities might be due to political constraints and arrangements or due to lobbing of
rms. As already discussed extensively in the introduction of this article free allocations
have been key to guarantee the political support necessary to introduce cap and trade sys-
tems, compare Convery(2009), Tietenberg(2006), Bovenberg (2008), or for example Grubb
and Neuho (2006)30. It is the purpose of the present section to analyze how a compe-
tition authority should optimally design a cap and trade mechanism if it can determine
only a subset of the parameters of the cap and trade mechanism, whereas the remaining
parameters are exogenously xed due to the above discussed problems.
Theorem 3 determines the optimal degree of free allocations for the case of exogenously
xed level of the total emission cap T . In theorems 4, 5 and 6 we determine the optimal
degree of free allocation to the remaining technologies and the corresponding level of the
optimal total emission cap T . Observe that our results obtained in lemma 4 in principle
would allow for a detailed analysis of those questions both for the cases of perfect and
imperfect competition. In order to limit the notational burden in the present paper we
restrict ourselves to the case of perfect competition, however. In this case the optimality
conditions determined in lemma 4 read as follows
WA1 :=
dX1
dA1
( A1) e + dX

2
dA1
(A1  A2) e = 0 (11)
WA2 :=
dX1
dA2
( A1) e + dX

2
dA2
(A1  A2) e = 0 (12)
WT :=
dX1
dT
( A1) e + dX

2
dT
(A1  A2) e  DT (T ) + e = 0: (13)
We rst analyze the case of an exogenously xed level of the cap on total emissions T ,
an example might be a situation where politicians are willing to introduce a cap and trade
mechanism but are reluctant to induce too severe (even though optimal from an overall
welfare point of view) distortions on the economy. The above optimality conditions directly
reveal that in a perfectly competitive market no free allocations should be granted to rms,
independently of the level of the emission cap.31 This is summarized in theorem 3.
30\Due in part to the sheer scale of the EU ETS, governments are subject to intense lobbying relating to
the distributional impact of the scheme, and are constrained by this and by concerns about the impact of
the system on industrial competitiveness. Few academics understand the real diculties that policy-makers
face when confronted with economically important industries claiming that government policy risks putting
them at a disadvantage relative to competitors."
31The results of theorem 3 for the case of imperfect competition obtain analogously, the optimal levels
of free allocation are given by conditions (i) and (ii) established in theorem 2.
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Theorem 3 (Optimal Design for fixed emission cap T ) For any exogenously xed
total emission cap T it is optimal to choose the levels of free allocation A1 = A

2 = 0.
That is, the result obtained in the rst best benchmark (theorem 1), where no free allocation
has been found to be optimal also obtains if the total emission cap is not set at an optimal
level. Observe that the reverse does not hold as we show in the subsequent theorem,
however.
Theorem 4 (Optimal Design for fixed allocations A1 and A2) Suppose the ini-
tial allocations A1 and A2 are xed exogenously. Dene
 0(A1; A2) := (A1  AE1 )A1	I1 + (A2  A1  AE2 )(A2  A1)	II2: (14)
The optimal emission cap T  has to be set such as to satisfy e = DT (T ) for  0(A1; A2) =
0, e > DT (T ) for  0(A1; A2) > 0, and e < DT (T ) for  0(A1; A2) < 0.
Proof See appendix F. 
Figure 3: Choosing the optimal T  for exogenously xed initial allocations A1 and A2.
Left: for relatively dirty base technology, i.e. w2 > w
E
2 , Right: for relatively clean base
technology, i.e. w2 < w
E
2 .
That is, for levels of free allocation A1; A2 which are not set optimally the optimal cap
on emissions T typically does not implement an emission price e equal to the social cost of
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pollution DT . To get an intuition for the result, note rst that the cap T on total emissions
governs the price for emission certicates e, which in turn inuences both investment
decisions and unconstrained production decisions at those spot markets where investment
is not binding. Optimal production decisions are induced by an emission price equal to the
social cost of pollution. This is only overall optimal in case of optimal investment incentives.
Now rst observe that in case of positive free allocations (as considered in the theorem)
investment incentives are distorted, however. That is, for A1 > 0 investment incentives in
the peak load technology are too high, for A2 > A1 (A2 < A1) investment incentives in the
base load technology are too high (low). A distortion of the emission price can then be
suited to at least partially adjust investment incentives.
Second observe that the impact of a changed emission cap T on investment incentives
already has been derived in lemma 3 (iii) and discussed in the subsequent text. As estab-
lished there a higher emission cap T (implying a lower emission price e) leads to increased
investment in the peak load technology X1 if and only if A1 < A
E
1 , it leads to increased
investment in the base load technology X2 if and only if A2 < A1 + A
E
2 .
Intuitively theorem 4 formally joins those two eects, that is, whenever the levels of
free allocation A1; A2 are such as to induce over investment, the total cap on emissions
should be set such as to induce an emission price which leads to a reduction of investment
incentives and vice versa. All those ndings are illustrated graphically in gure 3.
Consider the case A2 = A1 > 0, where all technologies get the same amount of free
allocations (the 45-degree line of gure 3). In the light of the above discussion this implies
rst of all that investment incentives in the base load technology are undistorted (since
A2 = A1) and investment incentives in the peak load technology are too high. For A1 < A
E
1
investment incentives are reduced for a higher emission price, for A1 > A
E
1 they are reduced
for a lower emission price. Next consider the case A2 = A1 + A
E
2 . In this case a changed
emission price e has no impact on investment in the base load technology, analogous
to above the optimal cap T is thus designed exclusively such as to reduce the too high
investment incentives in the peak load technology (i.e. for A1 < A
E
1 we have e
 > DT and
vice versa).32
We conclude the discussion of theorem 4 by applying our ndings to the current policy of
full allocation (Afull1 ; A
full
2 ) as observed during the current phase of the EU ETS and already
introduced at the end of section 3. Remember that we derived the following properties for
the levels of full allocation: Afull1 > A
E
1 and A
full
2 > A
full
1 + A
E
2 . As already discussed,
32Observe that an analogous reasoning obtains for the case A1 = 0, when only investment incentives in
the base load technology are distorted and the case A1 = A
E
1 , when a changed emission price has no impact
on investment in the peak load technology and only distortions of base load investment are to be adjusted
by the total emission cap.
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if we consider either lignite or coal red plants as the representative base load technology
and open cycle gas turbines as the representative peak load technology we also obtain
Afull2 > A
full
1 . For our framework we thus obtain that the optimal cap on total emissions
has to be set such that the equilibrium permit price is lower than the social cost of pollution,
i.e. e < DT .
In the subsequent theorem 5 we consider the case that only allocation for the peak load
technology A1 is exogenously xed, allocation for the base load technology A2 and the total
emission cap T can be determined optimally, however.
Theorem 5 (Optimal Design for fixed allocation A1) Suppose the allocation for
the peak technology A1 is exogenously xed. The optimal allocation for the base technology
then solves A2 =
dX2 =dA2 dX1 =dA2
dX2 =dA2
A1. More specically we obtain (see left graph of gure 4)8><>:
A2 = 0 if (A
cross
1  A1 < Alim1 )
0 < A2 < A1 if
 
(0 < A1 < A
E
1 ) & (w2 < w
E
2 )

OR
 
(AE1 < A1 < A
cross
1 ) & (w2 > w
E
2 )

A1 < A

2 if
 
(AE1 < A1 < A
cross
1 ) & (w2 < w
E
2 )

OR
 
(0 < A1 < A
E
1 ) & (w2 > w
E
2 )

:
The optimal cap T  is such that e > DT if A1 < AE1 and e
 < DT if A1 > AE1 .
Proof See appendix G. 
Figure 4: Left: Choosing the optimal A2 for exogenously xed initial allocation A1. Right:
Choosing the optimal A1 for exogenously xed initial allocation A2.
Observe that the optimality condition for A2 as stated in the theorem obtains directly
by rearranging expression (12). To derive the properties of the optimal degree of allocation
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for the base load technology A2 as stated in the theorem we can now make use of the
properties of comparative statics derived in lemma 3(i). Most importantly, as established
there, we always obtain
dX2
dA2
> 0. We thus obtain A2 > A1 if and only if
dX1
dA2
< 0. Since we
only consider non{negative levels of free allocation we furthermore obtain A2 = 0 whenever
0 <
dX2
dA2
<
dX1
dA2
. All those results of comparative statics have been derived in lemma 3 and
have been discussed subsequently in section 3. Figures 2 and 4 do thus in principle look
identical, observe however, that gure 2 exclusively states results of comparative statics,
whereas gure 4 illustrates the properties of the optimal allocation A2 by making use of
the previously obtained ndings.
The Intuition for the optimal level of free allocation T  in principle goes along the
same lines as the one provided for the ndings of theorem F. As compared to the rst best
benchmark, for positive allocation A1 investment incentives in the peak load technology are
too high. Whenever A1 < A
E
1 we obtain 	Ie < 0 which implies that a higher emission price
e allows to reduce investment incentives in the peak load technology. Observe furthermore
that investment incentives in the base load technology as induced by A2 are either too high
or too low (i.e. A2 > A1 for w2 > w
E
2 and vice versa). As we show in the theorem it is
optimal to set the total cap such as to obtain an emission price e > DT which induce
reduced investment incentives in the peak load technology whenever A1 < A
C
1 . Observe
that for A1 = A
C
1 we obtain A

2 = A1 = A
C
1 , which implies undistorted investment incentives
in the base load technology, in this case we thus obtain e = DT . The reverse hold true
for the case A1 > A
C
1 where the optimal emission cap T
 has to be set to obtain e < DT
which induces reduced investment incentives in the peak load technology.
In the subsequent theorem 6 we consider the case that allocation for the peak load
technology A2 is exogenously xed, allocation for the base load technology A2 and the total
emission cap T are determined optimally.
Theorem 6 (Optimal Design for fixed allocation A2) Suppose the allocation for
the base technology A2 is exogenously xed. The optimal allocation for the peak technology
then solves A1 =
dX2 =dA1
dX2 =dA1 dX1 =dA1A2. More specically (see right graph of gure 4)8><>:
A1 = 0 if (A
cross
2  A2 < Alim2 )
0 < A1 < A2 if
 
(0 < A2 < A
cross
2 ) & (w2 < w
S
2 )

OR
 
(0 < A2 < A
total
2 ) & (w2 > w
S
2 )

A2 < A

1 if (A
total
2 < A2 < A
lim
2 ):
Dene Aem2 := A
E
1 +A
E
2 . We obtain A
em
2 < A
total
2 and A
em
2 < A
cross
2 . The optimal cap T
 is
such that e < DT if A2 < Aem2 and e
 > DT if A2 > Aem2 .
Proof See appendix H. 
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Observe that the optimality condition for A1 as stated in the theorem obtains directly
by rearranging expression (11). To derive the properties of the optimal degree of allocation
for the peak load technology A1 as stated in the theorem we can now make use of the
properties of comparative statics derived in lemma 3(ii). Most importantly, as established
there, we always obtain
dX1
dA1
>
dX2
dA1
. Since we only consider non{negative levels of free
allocation we obtain A1 > 0 whenever
dX2
dA1
< 0. Furthermore we obtain A1 > A2 whenever
dX2
dA1
<
dX1
dA1
< 0.
Let us nally provide some intuition for the optimal cap on total emissions T . First of all
observe that for A2 < A
total
2 and A2 < A
cross
2 we always obtain 0 < A

1 < A2 which implies
that investment incentives both in the base load and the peak load technology are too high
as compared to the rst best benchmark. For low levels of allocation to the base load
technology (i.e. A2 < A

1(A2) + A
E
2 ) we obtain 	IIe < 0 which makes it optimal to induce
an emission price e > DT to lower investment incentives for both technologies.33 Observe
that for A2 = A

1(A2) + A
E
2 we obtain 	IIe = 0, a distortion of the emission price above
(or below) social cost of pollution has no impact on investment incentives in the base load
technology. However, investment incentives in the peak load technology are too high (since
A1 > 0). Since 	Ie < 0 the distortion of the emission price above social cost of pollution
is thus still suited to reduce investment incentives in the peak load technology. In total,
the theorem thus balances increased investment incentives in the base load technology with
reduced investment incentives in the peak load technology. The cut{o is reached where
	IIe + 	Ie = 0 which implies A2 = A
E
1 + A
E
2 = A
em
2 . That is for A2 < A
em
2 it is optimal
to set an emission cap T  which induces e > DT and for A2 > Aem2 the optimal cap T

induces e < DT .34 All those results are illustrated in gure 4.
We conclude the discussion of theorems 5 and 6 by applying our ndings to the current
policy of full allocation (Afull1 ; A
full
2 ) as observed during the current phase of the EU ETS
which served as the main illustrating example throughout this article:
First consider the case of theorem 5, where the allocation A1 for the peak technology
is exogenously xed. As already shown, under full allocation we obtain Afull1 2 [AE1 ; (1  
F (P ))w1]. For the case of a completely clean base load technology (that is w2 = 0, in the
context of electricity markets this would be the case for nuclear power plants for example)
under the current rules such technology would not obtain any permits. As our result
directly show, however, such technology should be granted more free allocations than the
peak technology, i.e. A2 > A
full
1 . Moreover the total emission cap T
 should be chosen such
33Observe that for AE2 < 0 this range is degenerated at zero.
34For A2 > A
cross
2 only investment incentives in the base load technology are distorted, since A
cross
2 >
Aem2 the optimal cap then clearly has to implement e
 > DT . For A2 > Atotal2 the optimal A

1(A2) > A2 is
so large that the optimal cap also has to implement e > DT , as we show.
29
as to implement e < DT in order to dampen excessive investment incentives induced by
those levels of free allocation.
Next consider the case of theorem 6, where the allocation A2 for the base technology is
exogenously xed. The optimal level of free allocation for the peak technology has to be
strictly positive if the peak technology is less emission intense than the base technology.
In particular, if the peak technology is completely clean (that is w1 = 0, in the context
of electricity markets this would be the case for small bio-gas red engines or turbines for
example), under full free allocation this technology would not receive any free permits. As
our result directly show, however, such technology should be granted a positive amount of
free permits. Unlike in the case discussed in the preceding paragraph, however, the level
of free allocation for the peak load technology should remain below the exogenously xed
level of free allocation for the base load technology. The reason for this dierence lies in
the fact that free allocations A2 for the base load technology only have an impact on the
resulting technology mix, free allocations A1 to the peak load technology have an impact
on the resulting technology mix and on rms' total investment activity. For exogenously
xed A2 the optimal level of A

1 is thus more moderate since it also leads to distorted
total investment decisions. Finally notice for the optimal cap on total emissions: Since
Aem2 < (1 F (B))w2 < Afull2 (compare denition 1 and the last paragraph of section 3) we
can directly conclude that the total cap on emission has to be chosen such as to implement
e < DT in order to dampen excessive investment incentives induced by those levels of free
allocation.
In sum, if one of the technologies is granted an exogenously xed level of free allocation
(e.g. due to lobbying) then the optimal pattern of allocations to the remaining technology
is completely dierent from the one that obtains under full allocation (for example as given
by current legislation in the EU ETS, compare German Parliament (2007)). Furthermore
for high levels of free allocation, the cap on total emissions should be chosen such as to
induce an emission permit price which is below marginal social cost of pollution in order to
reduce the distortions on the resulting technology mix.
5 Conclusion
Tradeable pollution permits are an increasingly important policy tool in environmental leg-
islation worldwide. The possibility of freely allocate permits provides an important possibil-
ity to share the regulatory burden. This seems to signicantly enhance the political support
for recently introduced legislations (see for example Tietenberg(2006), Bovenberg(2008), or
Convery(2009)). Since free allocations typically are subject to implicit or explicit updating
the allocation of permits has an impact on rms' decisions: First, updating of free alloca-
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tions on the one hand has an impact on rms' operation of existing production facilities
if they believe that current output or emissions do have an impact on allowances granted
in future periods. Second, updating also has an impact on rms' incentives to modify
their production facilities if free allocations are granted based on all current installations
of a rm.35 The rst phenomenon, where updating has an impact on current output and
emissions, has already been intensively analyzed in the literature (compare for example
Bohringer and Lange (2005), Rosendahl (2007), Mackenzie et al. (2008), or Harstadt and
Eskeland (2010)). All those contributions abstract however from an explicit analysis of the
impact of updating on rms' investment incentives which determine their technology mix
in the long run. We thus want to contribute to this literature by explicitly analyzing the
impact of a cap and trade scheme on rms' investment incentives. Since to a large extent
the long run implications are responsible for the nal success of a given environmental leg-
islation we have the impression that this provides an important contribution to the ongoing
debate on the optimal design of emission trading systems.
In the present article we have thus analyzed an analytical framework with tradeable
permits and a cap on total emissions. Potentially strategically acting rms have been
able to invest into production facilities (with dierent emission intensities), which allow
for production for a longer horizon of time. After establishing the market equilibrium and
the resulting technology mix, we have analyzed the optimal design of the cap and trade
mechanism.
As a benchmark we established the rst best solution which obtains for an ideal mar-
ket. We then have derived the optimal design of the cap and trade system for a series of
market imperfections. First we have analyzed the case of strategic investment and produc-
tion decisions in an imperfectly competitive market. This allowed to highlight the close
interdependency of mechanism to overcome low investment incentives (such as for example
capacity markets in electricity markets) and cap and trade mechanisms: If the endogenous
nature of emission prices in the presence of a cap and trade system is disregarded too high
investment incentives are induced.
We then have analyzed the case that the competition authority cannot freely choose all
parameters of the cap and trade system due to restrictions imposed by the political processes
(as intensively discussed in the literature). The optimal choice of the remaining parameters
diers substantially from that observed for the rst best benchmark. Our result showed for
example that if a certain technology receives free allocations it is typically optimal to grant
free allocations also to the remaining technology. However, those free allocations should
be the higher the less emission intensive the technology is. Interestingly those ndings are
35Compare Neuho et al. (2006), IEA (2010), or the current legislation of the EU ETS, for example
German Parliament (2007).
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entirely opposed to the pattern of free allocations granted in a system of full free allocation
as currently observed in EU ETS for example.
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A Proof lemma 1
Note that given our assumptions on demand and cost, existence of spot market equilibrium
at each demand scenario  is ensured for the case of perfect and imperfect competition.
We denote by qi (; x) spot market output of rm i in scenario , given investments x =
(x11; : : : ; x1n; x21; : : : ; x2n). Remember, X1 and X2 denote industry investment in either
technology and Q() industry output at each spot market , it is given as follows:
Q =
8>>><>>>:
Q : P (Q; ) + Pq(Q; )
Q
n   c2   w2e = 0 if  2 [; B ]
X2 if  2 [B ; P ]
Q : P (Q; ) + Pq(Q; )
Q
n   c1   w1e = 0 if  2 [P ; P ]
X1 if  2 [P ; ]
(15)
The critical spot market scenarios are dened as follows:
B : P (X2; B) + Pq(X2; B)
1
n
  c2   w2e = 0
P : P (X2; P ) + Pq(X2; P )
1
n
  c1   w1e = 0
P : P (X1; P ) + Pq(X1; P )
1
n
  c1   w1e = 0
That is, at spot market B investment X2 in the base{load technology (c2; k2) starts to
be binding, at P rms start to produce with the peak{load technology (c1; k1) and at P
the total capacity bound X1 is met. The rst order conditions stated in lemma (1) obtain
when equating expressions (16), (17), and (18) to zero. Notice that the case solution for
the case perfect competition obtains as the special case where n!1.
We rst derive the rst order conditions for optimal investment decisions. Note that,
although in equilibrium at dierent demand realizations  rm i might sometimes produce
an unconstrained equilibrium quantity and sometimes is constrained by its choice x1i or x2i,
equilibrium prot of rm i is continuous in . Thus, by Leibniz' rule, the rst derivatives
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of the prot function are given as follows:
di
dx1i
=
Z 
P

P (X1; ) + Pq(X1; )
X1
n
  (c1 + w1e)

dF ()  (k1  A1e) (16)
di
dx2i
=
Z P
B

P (X2; ) + Pq(X2; )
X2
n
  (c2 + w2e)

dF () +
Z 
P
(c1   c2) + (w1   w2)edF ()  (k2  A2e) + (k1  A1e) (17)
In the market solution the emission price e has to be such as to equate the following
expression to zero: Z B

w2Q
dF () +
Z P
B
w2X2dF () +
Z P
P
w1Q
dF ()
+
Z 
P
w1X1dF () 
Z 
P
(w1   w2)X2dF ()  T (18)
Which are the conditions 	I , 	II and 	E as given in the lemma.
Let us directly at this point determine all partial derivatives of the equilibrium system
characterized in the lemma. The partial derivatives of 	I (expression (16)), 	II (expression
(17)) and 	E (expression (18)) read as follows:
@	I
@X1
= 	I1 =
Z 
 P
Pq (X

1 ; )
n+ 1
n
+ Pqq (X

1 ; )
X1
n
dF () < 0
@	II
@X2
= 	II2 =
Z P
 B
Pq (X

2 ; )
n+ 1
n
+ Pqq (X

2 ; )
X2
n
dF () < 0
@	E
@e
= 	Ee =
Z  B

w22
Pq(Q; )n+1n + Pqq(Q
; )Q

n
dF () +
Z  P
P
w21
Pq(Q; )n+1n + Pqq(Q
; )Q

n
dF () < 0
@	E
@X1
= 	E1 = (1  F (P ))w1 = AE1 > 0
@	I
@e
= 	Ie = A1   (1  F ( P ))w1 = A1  AE1
@	E
@X2
= 	E2 = (1  F ( B))w2   (1  F (P ))w1 = AE2
@	II
@e
= 	IIe = A2  A1   (1  F ( B))w2 + (1  F (P ))w1 = A2  A1  AE2
@	I
@A1
= e
@	II
@A1
=  e @	II
@A2
= e
@	E
@T
=  1:
B Proof lemma 2
Part (i): To derive the second order conditions established in lemma 2, rst observe that
dierentiation of the permit pricing condition 	E with respect to X1 and slight rearranging
yields de

dX1
= 	E1 	Ee . Plugging into the derivatives of 	I and 	II and replacing for A
E
1 and
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AE2 as introduced in denition 1 yields:
d	I
dX1
= 	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee = 	I1 + (A1  A
E
1 )
AE1
 	Ee
d	II
dX1
= 	IIe
	E1
 	Ee = (A2  A1  A
E
2 )
AE1
 	Ee
Likewise we obtain
d	I
dX2
= 	Ie
	E2
 	Ee = (A1  A
E
1 )
AE2
 	Ee
d	II
dX1
= 	II2 +	IIe
	E2
 	Ee = 	II2 + (A2  A1  A
E
2 )
AE2
 	Ee
The matrix H =
 
d	I=dX1 d	I=dX2
d	II=dX1 d	II=dX2
!
is negative denite if and only if conditions
(a), (b) and (c) established in lemma 2 (i) are satised. To save on notation we introduce
C := det(H), observe that C  0 if H is negative denite (compare (c) in lemma 2 (i)).
Part (ii): Since 	I1 < 0, 	II2 < 0 and 	Ee < 0 (see appendix A) the conditions
provided in lemma 2 (ii) are sucient to guarantee negative deniteness of the matrix H.
Part (iii): To see why this is true, just observe that for A1 > A
lim
1 condition (a)
established in lemma 2(i) will be violated. The condition dening Alim2 is given by the sum
of conditions (a) and (b) of lemma 2(i), for A1 > A
lim
1 at least one of those two conditions
will be violated.
C Proof lemma 3
C.1 Preliminaries: Comparative Statics
The dierentials for
dX1
dA1
,
dX1
dA2
,
dX1
dT and
dX2
dA1
,
dX2
dA2
,
dX2
dT are obtained by applying the implicity
function theorem to the equilibrium conditions established in lemma 1. The total derivative
of this equations system with respect to the parameter A1 yields:
	I : 	I1
dX1
dA1
+	Ie
de
dA1
+
@	I
@A1
 0 (19)
	II : 	II2
dX2
dA1
+	IIe
de
dA1
+
@	II
@A1
 0 (20)
	E : 	E1
dX1
dA1
+	E2
dX2
dA1
+	Ee
de
dA1
+
@	E
@A1
 0 (21)
In order to derive an explicit formulation for
dX1
dA1
, we solve expression (21) for de

dA1
and
expression (20) for
dX2
dA1
. Plugging into expression (19) yields:0@	I1 +	Ie 	E1 	Ee

 

	Ie
	E2
 	Ee
 	IIe 	E1 	Ee
	II2 +	IIe
	E2
 	Ee

1A dX1
dA1
+
@	I
@A1
 

	Ie
	E2
 	Ee

@	II
@A1
	II2 +	IIe
	E2
 	Ee
 = 0
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By making use of the denition of the variable C (compare appendix B) we can rearrange
this expression and obtain:
dX1
dA1
= ( 1)
@	I
@A1

	II2 +	IIe
	E2
 	Ee

  @	II@A1

	Ie
	E2
 	Ee

C
=
 
(A2  AE1  AE2 )AE2  	II2	Ee
  e
 	EeC (22)
Likewise, to obtain an explicit formulation for
dX2
dA1
, we analogously solve expression (21)
for de

dA1
and expression (19) for
dX2
dA1
. Plugging into expression (20) and solving for
dX2
dA1
yields:
dX2
dA1
= ( 1)
@	II
@A1

	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

  @	I@A1

	IIe
	E1
 	Ee

C
=
 
(A2  AE1  AE2 )AE1  	I1	Ee
 e
 	EeC (23)
Analogously we obtain:
dX1
dA2
=
 
(A1  AE1 )AE2
 e
 	EeC
dX2
dA2
=
 
(A1  AE1 )AE1  	I1	Ee
  e
 	EeC (24)
dX1
dT
=
 
A1  AE1
 	II2
 	EeC
dX2
dT
=
 
A2  A1  AE2
 	I1
 	EeC
C.2 Proof lemma 3(i)
First, we dene
 lim1 (A1) := 	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee =
Z 
P
Pq(X

1 ; )dF () +
(A1  AE1 )AE1R B

w22
 Pq(Q;)dF () +
R P
P
w21
 Pq(Q;)dF ()
: (25)
Observe, that the second order sucient conditions for existence of the market equilibrium
specied in 2(i) require  lim1 (A1) < 0. Since  
lim
1 (A1) is increasing in A1 we can dene a
unique Alim1 which solves  
lim
1 (A
lim
1 ) = 0 and conclude that
dX2
dA2
> 0 for all A1 < A
lim
1 .
Second, we dene
 total1 (A1) := 	Ie
	E2
 	Ee =
 
A1  AE1

AE2R B

w22
 Pq(Q;)dF () +
R P
P
w21
 Pq(Q;)dF ()
(26)
This allows us to rewrite
dX1
dA2
as established in expression (24) as follows:
dX1
dA2
=  total1 (A1)
e
C
(27)
We nally show that AE1 < A
lim
1 . To see this, observe that  
lim
1 (A
E
1 ) = 	I1 < 0. Since
 lim1 (A1) is increasing in A1, we necessarily obtain A
lim
1 > A
E
1 .
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Third, we dene
 cross1 (A1) := 	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee +	Ie
	E2
 	Ee =Z 
P
Pq(X

1 ; )dF () +
 
A1  AE1
  
AE1 +A
E
2
R B

w22
 Pq(Q;)dF () +
R P
P
w21
 Pq(Q;)dF ()
Observe that
dX2
dA2
<
dX1
dA2
if and only if  cross1 (A1) > 0 (compare expression (24)). We dene
the locus where  cross1 (A1) = 0 by A
cross
1 . We now compare the critical allocation A
cross
1
relative to the critical values Alim1 and A
E
1 :
• For w2 > wE2 , we can establish the following ranking: AE1 < Across1 < Alim1 .
To show the rst inequality observe that for all A1  AE1 we obtain  total1 (A1)  0.
As shown above we also obtain  lim1 (A1)  0, which implies  cross1 (A1) =  lim1 (A1) +
 total1 (A1)  0. This directly implies, however, that Across1 cannot be in the interval
[0; AE1 ].
To show the second inequality observe that for A1 > A
E
1 we have  
total
1 (A1) > 0.
Whenever  cross1 (A1) =  
lim
1 (A1) +  
total
1 (A1) = 0 we must thus have  
lim
1 (A1) < 0.
Since  lim1 (A1) is strictly increasing in A1 this implies A
lim
1 > A
cross
1 .
• For w2 < wE2 we establish that  cross1 (A1) < 0 (i.e. A1 > 0) for all A1 2 (0; Alim1 ].
First, observe that for A1 > A
E
1 we obtain  
total
1 (A1) < 0, which implies that
 cross1 (A1) =  
lim
1 (A1) +  
total
1 (A1) < 0 for A1 2 [AE1 ; Alim1 ].
Second observe that for A1  AE1 and ((1  F (B))w2   (F (P )  F (P ))w1) > 0 we
obtain  cross1 (A1) < 0.
Third observe that for A1  AE1 and ((1  F (B))w2   (F (P )  F (P ))w1) < 0,
 cross1 (A1) is maximized for A1 = 0. Expression (28) then reads as follows:
 cross1 (0) =
Z 
P
Pq(X

1 ; )dF () +
  (1  F (P ))w1
 
(1  F (B))w2   (F (P )  F (P ))w1
R B

w22
 Pq(Q;)dF () +
R P
P
w21
 Pq(Q;)dF ()
Which can be guaranteed to be negative if Pqq  0 and Pq  0. Without those
additional assumptions it might happen that A1 = 0 in the region where A1  AE1
and ((1  F (B))w2   (F (P )  F (P ))w1) < 0.
C.3 Proof lemma 3(ii)
First, we dene
 lim2 (A2) :=

	II2 +	I1 + (	IIe +	Ie)
	E2 +	E1
 	Ee

: (28)
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In order to precisely dene Alim2 rst observe that 	E2+	E1 = A
E
1 +A
E
2 (compare denition
1), we thus have to consider the following two cases:
• For the case w2 > wL2 (i.e. AE1 + AE2 > 0)  lim2 is strictly increasing in A2, we can
dene a unique Alim2 which solves  
lim
2 (A
lim
2 ) = 0
• For the case w2  wL2 (i.e. AE1 + AE2  0)  lim2 (A2) is non-increasing in A2, it is thus
minimized for A2 = 0, which yields
 lim2 = 	II2 +	I1 +
 
A2   (AE1 +AE2 )
 AE1 +AE2
 	Ee < 0:
That is,  lim2 (A1) < 0 for all A2  0. For ease of notation we thus dene Alim2 = 1
in this case.
We now determine
dX2
dA1
  dX2
dA1
as given by expressions (22) and (22). After plugging in
for @	I
@A1
= e and @	II
@A1
=  e (compare appendix A) we obtain for dX1
dA1
  dX2
dA1
:
	II2 +	IIe
	E2
 	Ee

+

	Ie
	E2
 	Ee

+

	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

+

	IIe
	E1
 	Ee
  e
C
=
 e
C
 lim2 (A2)
Since  lim2 (A2) < 0 as established above, we conclude that
dX1
dA1
>
dX2
dA1
for all A2 2 [0; Alim2 ].
Second, we dene
 total2 (A2) :=

	II2 +	IIe
	E2
 	Ee

+

	Ie
	E2
 	Ee

=

	II2 +
 
A2  AE1  AE2
 AE2
 	Ee

(29)
• For w2 > wE2 (i.e. AE2 > 0, see denition 1)  total2 (A2) is strictly increasing in A2. Since
 total2 (0) < 0, we can thus dene a unique A
total
2 > 0 which satises  
total
2 (A
total
2 ) = 0.
• For the case w2  wE2 (i.e. AE2  0, see denition 1)  total2 (A2) is non-increasing in
A2. Observe that in this case  
total
2 is maximized for (A2 = 0; w2 = 0) which yields:
 total2 (0) =

	II2 +
 
A2  AE1  AE2
 AE2
 	Ee

< 0: (30)
That is, for A2  0 we obtain  total2 (A2) < 0. For ease of notation we thus dene
Atotal2 :=1 whenever w2  wE2 .
Observe now that we can rewrite
dX1
dA1
(established in expression (23)) in terms of  total2 ,
which yields:
dX1
dA1
=  total2 (A2)
 e
C
(31)
Third, we dene
 cross2 (A2) :=

	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

+

	IIe
	E1
 	Ee

= 	I1 +
 
A2  AE1  AE2
 AE1
 	Ee (32)
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We now rewrite
dX2
dA1
as established in expression (23) in terms of  cross2 , which yields:
dX2
dA1
=  cross2 (A2)
e
C
(33)
Observe that  cross2 is strictly increasing in A2 (see appendix A). Since  
cross
2 (0) < 0, we
can thus dene a unique Across2 > 0 which satises  
cross
2 (A
cross
2 ) = 0:
Across2 = A
E
1 +A
E
2 +
	I1	Ee
AE1
(34)
Finally we compare the dierent critical values: Alim2 , A
total
2 , and A
cross
2 . We have to
consider the following three cases:
• For w2  wL2 : In this case we obtain  lim2 (A2) < 0 and  total2 (A2) < 0 for all A2  0.
Thus Across2 provides the only critical level of initial allocation (remember, we dened
Alim2 =1 and Atotal2 =1), we thus obtain Across2 < Alim2 .
• For wL2 < w2  wE2 : In this case we obtain  total2 (A2) < 0 for all A2  0 (remember, we
dened Atotal2 =1). Observe, furthermore that  lim2 (A2) =  total2 (A2) + cross2 (A2) for
all A2. This directly implies, however, that  
cross
2 (A
lim
2 ) > 0 and thus A
cross
2 < A
lim
2 .
• For w2  wE2 we evaluate  total2 (Across2 ), which yields (compare expressions (29)
and(34)):
 total2 (A
cross
2 ) = 	II2  	I1
AE2
AE1
= P 2q
 
F (P )  F (B)
  P 1q (1  F (B))w2   (1  F (P ))w1w1 (35)
Observe that we denote by P 1q the average slope of demand for those demand levels
where total investment is binding and by P 2q the average slope of demand for those
demand levels where base load investment is binding, i.e.:
(i) P 1q :=
R
P
Pq(X

1 ; )dF ()
1  F (P )
(ii) P 2q :=
PR
B
Pq(X

2 ; )dF ()
F (P )  F (B)
(36)
Rearranged this yields:
 total2 (A
cross
2 ) =
 P 1q (1  F (B))
w1
0B@w2  
0B@ (1  F (P )) + (F (P )  F (B))
P 2q
P 1q
1  F (B)
1CAw1
1CA (37)
Now dene
wS2 :=
(1  F (P )) + (F (P )  F (B))
P 2q
P 1q
1  F (B)
w1 (38)
Observe, that wE2 < w
S
2  w1 since F (P )   F (B) > 0 and 0 < P
2
q
P 1q
 1, notice
that for P 2q = P
1
q (e.g. for Pqq = Pq = 0) we obtain w
S
2 = w1. Furthermore, for
40
w2 > w
S
2 we obtain  
total
2 (A
cross
2 ) > 0 and for w2 < w
S
2 we obtain  
total
2 (A
cross
2 ) < 0.
Since  lim2 (A2) =  
total
2 (A2) +  
cross
2 (A2) for all A2 we obtain:
0 < Atotal2 < A
lim
2 < A
cross
2 if w2 > w
S
2
0 < Atotal2 = A
lim
2 = A
cross
2 if w2 = w
S
2
0 < Across2 < A
lim
2 < A
total
2 if w
E
2 < w2 < w
S
2
(39)
C.4 Proof lemma 3(iii)
Observe that we have derived
dX1
dT
and
dX2
dT
in expression (24). The statements of lemma
3(iii) follow directly since 	I1 < 0, 	II2 < 0 and 	Ee < 0 (see denition 1).
D Proof lemma 4
To derive the optimal design of the cap and trade mechanism (A1; A2; T ) we rst dier-
entiate Welfare as given by expression (10) with respect to each of those parameters. We
obtain for dW
dA1
:
dW
dA1
=
Z B

dQ
dA1
[P (Q; )  c2] dF () +
Z P
P
dQ
dA1
[P (Q; )  c1] dF () +
dX2
dA1
"Z P
B
[P (X2 ; )  c2] dF () +
Z 
P
(c1   c2)dF ()  (k2   k1)
#
+
dX1
dA1
"Z 
P
[P (X1 ; )  c1] dF ()  k1
#
We can now plug in the equilibrium conditions for rms' investment choices given by
expressions (2) and (3) and we can plug in the optimality conditions for the unconstrained
spot markets, whenever investment is not binding. 36 This yields:
dW
dA1
=
Z B

dQ
dA1

 PqQ

n
+ w2e

dF () +
Z P
P
dQ
dA1

 PqQ

n
+ w1e

dF ()
dX2
dA1
"Z P
B

 PqX

2
n
+ w2e

dF () +
Z 
P
(w2   w1)edF ()  (A2  A1)e
#
+
dX1
dA1
"Z 
P
[ Pq + w1e] dF () A1e
#
This can be further simplied by making use of the derivative of the permit pricing given
by expression 4 with respect to A1 (i.e.
	E
A1
. This allows to eliminate all terms containing
the emission factors w1 and w2 from the above expression (shown explicitly in expression
36That is for spot markets  2 [; B ][ [P ; P ], in those cases the optimality conditions are simply given
by P (Q; ) + Pq Q

n   ci   wie = 0, for i = 1; 2.
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(41) just below). We thus obtain
dW
dA1
=
Z B

dQ
dA1

 PqQ

n

dF () +
Z P
P
dQ
dA1

 PqQ

n

dF () (40)
dX2
dA1
"Z P
B

 PqX

2
n

dF ()  (A2  A1)e
#
+
dX1
dA1
"Z 
P

 PqX

1
n

dF () A1e
#
In order to show why indeed expression (40) is obtained, we now dierentiate the permit
pricing condition 	E (compare lemma 1) with respect to A1, this yields
 
Z B

w2
dQ
dA1
dF () 
Z P
P
w1
dQ
dA1
dF () = (41)
dX2
dA1
"Z P
B
w2dF () +
Z 
P
(w2   w1)dF ()
#
+
dX1
dA1
"Z 
P
w1dF ()
#
:
Now observe that dQ

dA1
= dQ

de
de
dA1
, since unconstrained spot market output does not directly
depend on the degree of free allocation A1. By multiplying expression (41) with  (as
dened in the lemma) we obtain: Z B

dQ
de

 PqQ

n

dF () +
Z P
P
dQ
de

 PqQ

n

dF ()
!
de
dA1
=
 
n

dX2
dA1
AE2 +
dX1
dA1
AE1

(42)
We can now plug expression (42) into expression (40), which yields
dW
dA1
=
 
n

dX2
dA1
AE2 +
dX1
dA1
AE1

+
dX2
dA1
"Z P
B

 PqX

2
n

dF ()  (A2  A1)e
#
+
dX1
dA1
"Z 
P

 PqX

1
n

dF () A1e
#
Rearranging nally yields
dW
dA1
=
dX2
dA1
"Z P
B

 PqX

2
n

dF ()  (A2  A1)e  
n
AE2
#
+
dX1
dA1
"Z 
P

 PqX

1
n

dF () A1e  
n
AE1
#
Which corresponds exactly to the expression for dW
dA1
stated in the lemma. The very same
steps yield dW
dA2
=
dX1
dA2

I +
dX2
dA2

II as stated in the lemma.
We nally determine dW
dT
. Analogous to expression (40) we obtain:
dW
dT
=
dX2
dT
"Z P
B

 PqX

2
n

dF ()  (A2  A1)e
#
+
dX1
dT
"Z 
P

 PqX

1
n

dF () A1e
#
(43)
Z B

dQ
dT

 PqQ

n

dF () +
Z P
P
dQ
dT

 PqQ

n

dF () + e  DT (T )
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Which obtains since all terms containing the emission factors w1 and w2 integrate to 1.
Why this is the case becomes clear when dierentiating the permit pricing condition 	E
with respect to T :
 
Z B

w2
dQ
dT
dF () 
Z P
P
w1
dQ
dT
dF () =
dX2
dT
AE2 +
dX1
dT
AE1   1:
Now observe that dQ

dT
= dQ

de
de
dT
, since unconstrained spot market output does not directly
depend on the total emission cap T . By multiplying expression (44) with 
n
we obtain: Z B

dQ
de

 PqQ

n

dF () +
Z P
P
dQ
de

 PqQ

n

dF ()
!
de
dT
=
 
n

dX2
dT
AE2 +
dX1
dT
AE1   1

(44)
We can now plug expression (44) into expression (43), which yields after rearranging:
dW
dT
=
dX2
dT
"Z P
B

 PqX

2
n

dF ()  (A2  A1)e  
n
AE2
#
+
dX1
dT
"Z 
P

 PqX

1
n

dF () A1e  
n
AE1
#
+

n
+ e  DT (T )
Which corresponds exactly to the expression for dW
dT
stated in the lemma.
E Proof theorems 1 and 2
The optimality conditions established in lemma 4 are satised if the following conditions
hold:

I =
Z 
P
 PqX1
n
dF () A1e   
n
AE1 = 0

II =
Z P
B
 PqX2
n
dF ()  (A2  A1)e   
n
AE2 = 0
e = DT (T )  
n
:
The case of perfect competition as analyzed in theorem 1 obtains for n  > infty. Observe
that elimination of all terms involving the number of rms n in the denominator in the
above conditions yields the characterization of the rst best solution stated in theorem 1.
In order to obtain the solution obtained for the case of imperfect competition as established
in theorem 2 we solve the rst two conditions for the levels of free allocation A1 and A2.
F Proof theorem 4
The optimality condition for T has been derived in lemma 4 (iii). After plugging in the
results of comparative statics for dX1
dT and
dX2
dT derived in expression (24) we obtain:
e  DT =

(A2  A1)e	IIe 	I1 	Ee C +A1e	Ie
	II2
 	Ee C

(45)
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We now make use of the notation introduced in denition 1, which allows us to rewrite
expression (45) as follows:
e  DT =
 
(A2  A1  AE2 )(A2  A1)	II2 + (A1  AE1 )A1	I1
 e
 	Ee C (46)
Notice that e

 	Ee C > 0 as established in appendix A. The remainder of the right hand side
of expression (46) states  0(A1; A2) as dened in expression (14). The expression e
 DT (T )
and  0 do thus exhibit the same sign, which proofs the theorem.
G Proof theorem 5
As a rst step we determine the properties of the optimal allocation A2. Observe that
the optimality condition A2 =
dX2 =dA2 dX1 =dA2
dX2 =dA2
A1 stated in the theorem directly obtains by
rearranging expression (12). In lemma 3 (i) we have established
dX2
dA2
> 0 for all A1 < A
lim
1 .
We thus obtain A2 > A1 if and only if
dX1
dA2
< 0. Furthermore, we obtain A2 = 0 if
dX2
dA2
<
dX1
dA2
since we only consider non{negative levels of free allocation. By making use
of the properties of comparative statics established in lemma 3 (i) we directly obtain the
properties of A2 as stated in the theorem.
As a second step we determine the optimal emission cap T . The optimality condition
for T  has been derived in expression (13) and yields after substituting for A2:
e  DT = dX

1
dT A1e 
dX2
dT A1e

dX1=dA2
dX2=dA2

:
After substituting for dX1
dT ,
dX2
dT ,
dX1
dA2
, and dX2
dA2
(expression (24)) this reads as follows:
e  DT =
0@(	II2	Ie)  (	I1	IIe)
24

 	Ie	E2	Ee

 

	I1  	Ie	E1	Ee

351A A1e
 	Ee C
Rearranging and plugging in for 	Ie (compare appendix A) we obtain:
e  DT =
 
AE1  A1
 	I1 	IIe 	E2 	Ee+	II2 	I1 +	Ie 	E1 	EeA1e
	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

	Ee C
(47)
Observe that for A1 < A
lim
1 the sign of the right hand side of expression (47) is entirely
determined by the expression (AE1  A1), the remainder of expression (47) is strictly positive
since

	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

< 0 and

	IIe
	E2
 	Ee

< 0 (as shown further below in step three).
Finally notice that expression (47) has been derived without non{negativity constraint
on A2. As shown above, however, for w2 > w
E
2 and A1 2 [AE1 ; Alim1 ] we obtain A2 = 0
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(instead of a negative value as resulting in the computations leading to expression (47)).
In this case the optimality condition given by expression (13) simplies as follows:
e  DT =

dX1
dT  
dX2
dT

A1e = (	II2	Ie  	I1	IIe) A1e 	Ee C < 0 (48)
The inequality obtains since 	Ie > 0 and 	IIe < 0 for w2 > w
E
2 and A1 2 [AE1 ; Alim1 ]
(compare appendix A). We thus summarize the results obtained in expressions (47) and
(54) as follows: 8><>:
e > DT if A1 < AE1
e = DT if A1 = AE1
e < DT if A1 > AE1
(49)
As a third step We nally show that the second order conditions established in lemma 2
(i) are indeed satised for all A1 2 [0; Alim1 ], A2. Since

	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

< 0 for A1 < A
lim
1
we just need to show that

	IIe
	E2
 	Ee

< 0 for A1 < A
lim
1 . Notice rst that we can rewrite
	IIe (compare appendixA) and thus obtain:
	IIe
	E2
 	Ee = (A

2  A1  	E2)
	E2
 	Ee (50)
Furthermore, we obtain for (A2   A1) (compare expressions (12) and (24)):
(A2  A1) =  
dX1
dA2
dX2
dA2
A1 =

	Ie
	E2
 	Ee

A1
	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

Plugging in allows us to rewrite expression (50) as follows:
	IIe
	E2
 	Ee =
(	E2)
2
	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

( 	Ee)

	Ie
A1
 	Ee  

	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

Substituting for 	Ie = A1   AE1 and 	E1 = AE1 (see appendix A) then yields:
	IIe
	E2
 	Ee =
(	E2)
2
	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

(	Ee)

	I1   (A1  A
E
1 )
2
 	Ee

< 0
We can thus conclude that the second order conditions established in in lemma 2 (i) are
satised if and only if A1 < A
lim
1 (Notice that the \only if" part follows directly from lemma
2 (iii)).
H Proof theorem 6
As a rst step we determine the properties of the optimal allocation A1. Observe that
the optimality condition A1 =
dX2 =dA1
dX2 =dA1 dX1 =dA1A2 stated in the theorem directly obtains
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by rearranging expression (11). In lemma 3 (ii) we have established
dX1
dA1
>
dX2
dA1
for all
A2 < A
lim
2 . We thus obtain A

1 > 0 if and only if
dX2 =dA1
<
0. Furthermore, we obtain
A1 > A2 if and only if
dX2
dA1
<
dX1
dA1
< 0. By making use of the properties of comparative
statics established in lemma 3 (ii) we directly obtain the properties of A1 as stated in the
theorem.
As a second step we determine the optimal emission cap T . The optimality condition
for T  has been derived in expression (13) and yields after substituting for A1 (compare
the rst step above):
e  DT = dX2
dT (A2  A

1) e
 +
dX1
dT A

1e
 =
dX2
dT
dX1
dA1
A2e

dX1
dA1
  dX2dA1
+
dX1
dT
 dX2dA1A2e
dX1
dA1
  dX2dA1
We can now plug in for dX1
dA1
and dX2
dA1
as derived in expressions (22) and (23) and for dX1
dT
and dX2
dT as derived in expressions (24), which yields:
e  DT = ( 1)A2 (e
)2
dX1
dA1
  dX2dA1

( 	Ee)C2

(	Ie	II2)

	I1 +	Ie
	E1
 	Ee

+

	IIe
	E1
 	Ee

+
(	IIe	I1)

	II2 +	IIe
	E2
 	Ee

+

	Ie
	E2
 	Ee

= (	Ie +	IIe)
( 1)A2 (e)2
dX1
dA1
  dX2dA1

( 	Ee)C
(51)
Now dene:
 em2 (A2) := 	Ie +	IIe = A2   (AE1 +AE2 ): (52)
Observe that  em2 (A
em
2 ) = 0. Furthermore notice that A
em
2 < 0 for w2 < w
L
2 , that is,
 em2 (A2) > 0 for all A2  0 whenever w2 < wL2 . In order to compare Aem2 to the previously
established critical levels of initial allocation we make the following two observations:
 total2 (A
em
2 ) = 	II2 < 0 and  
cross
2 (A
em
2 ) = 	I1 < 0
This allows to directly conclude that Aem2 < A
total
2 and A
em
2 < A
cross
2 .
By making use of the newly introduced  em2 we can rewrite expression (51) as follows:
e  DT =   em2 (A2)
A2e

dX1
dA1
  dX2dA1

( 	Ee)C
(53)
Finally notice that expression (53) has been derived without non{negativity constraint
on A1. As shown in step one of the present proof, however, for w2 < w
S
2 and A2 2
[Across2 ; A
lim
2 ] we obtain A

1 = 0 (instead of a negative value as resulting in the computations
leading to expression (53)). In this case the optimality condition given by expression (13)
simplies as follows:
e  DT = dX

2
dT A2e
 =
	I1	IIe
 	Ee CA2e
 =
dX2
dT A2e
 =
 
A2  A1  AE2
 	I1 A2e
 	Ee C < 0 (54)
Observe that the above inequality is satised, since A2  A1+AE2 whenever Across2  A2 
Alim2 (compare expression (34), remember that A1 = A

1 = 0 in the case considered).
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We can thus establish the following results for the optimal cap on total emissions:8><>:
e > DT if A2 < Aem2
e = DT if A2 = Aem2
e < DT if A2 > Aem2
(55)
As a third step We nally show that the second order conditions established in lemma
2(i) are indeed satised for all A2 2 [0; Alim2 ], A1. Remember we obtained for A1:
A1 =
 cross2
 lim2
A2 =
 cross2
 cross2 +  
total
2
A2
In order to verify the second order conditions established in lemma 2(i) (a), (b), and (c)
we now separately analyze the following cases:
• First, observe that
	IIe
	E2
 	Ee = (A2  A1  	E2)
	E2
 	Ee =

 total2
 lim2
A2  	E2

	E2
 	Ee (56)
{ For w2 < w
E
2 (i.e. 	E2 < 0) expression (56) is negative, since  
total
2 < 0 and
 lim2 < 0 if A2 < A
lim
2 and w2 < w
E
2 (compare appendix C).
{ For w2 > w
E
2 (i.e. 	E2 > 0) and A
total
2  A2  Alim2 expression (56) is negative,
since  total2  0 and  lim2 < 0.
Whenever expression(56) is negative this directly implies that condition (b) is satis-
ed. Since furthermore A2 < A
lim
2 also conditions (a) and (c) are satised.
• Second, for Across2  A2  Alim2 we obtain A1 = 0 (compare step one of the present
proof). We thus directly obtain:
	Ie
	E1
 	Ee =  A
E
1
	E1
 	Ee < 0 (57)
This directly implies that condition (a) is satised. Since furthermore A2 < A
lim
2 also
conditions (b) and (c) are satised.
• Third, for w2 > wE2 (i.e. 	E2 > 0) and 0  A2  min(Atotal2 ; Across2 )
{ Whenever A2 < A1 +A
E
2 (i.e. 	IIe < 0), we directly obtain 	IIe
	E2
 	Ee < 0. This
directly implies that condition (b) is satised. Since furthermore A2 < A
lim
2 , also
conditions (a) and (c) are satised.
{ Whenever A2  A1+AE2 (i.e. 	IIe  0), then 	IIe 	E1 	Ee > 0. Since  cross2 < 0 in
the region considered this directly implies that condition (a) is satised. Since
furthermore A2 < A
lim
2 also condition (b) is satised. Finally, since conditions
(a) and (b) are satised and  cross2 < 0 and  
total
2 < 0, also condition (c) is
satised.
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We can thus conclude that the second order conditions as established in lemma 2(i) are
satised for all 0  A2  Alim2 .
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